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Abstract
This paper characterizes the trade-off between the income gains and the inequality
costs of trade using survey data for 54 developing countries. Tariff data on agricultural
and manufacturing goods are combined with household survey data on detailed income
and expenditure patterns to estimate the first order effects of the elimination of tariffs
on household welfare. We assess how these welfare effects vary across the distribution
by estimating impacts on the consumption of traded goods, wage income, farm and
non-farm family enterprise income, and government transfers. For each country, the
income gains and the inequality costs of trade liberalization are quantified and the
trade-offs between them are assessed using an Atkinson social welfare index. We find
average income gains from liberalization in 44 countries and average income losses in
10 countries. Across countries in our sample, the gains from trade are 1.8 percent of
real household expenditure on average. We find overwhelming evidence of a trade-off
between the income gains (losses) and the inequality costs (gains), which arise because
trade tends to exacerbate income inequality: 46 countries face a trade-off, while only 8
do not. These trade-offs are typically resolved in favor of lower tariffs. In the majority
of developing countries, the prevailing tariff structure thus induces sizeable welfare
losses.
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1 Introduction
The recent wave of ‘new’ trade models has rekindled interest in the gains from trade. The
results and theorems on the aggregate gains from trade in Dixit and Norman (1980, 1986)
have been extended by Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2012), Costinot, Donaldson
and Komunjer (2012) and Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014).1 Concurrently, there has
also been a renewed interest in the distribution of the gains from trade. These are the focus of
Porto (2006), Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2015), Atkin and Donaldson (2015), and Atkin,
Faber and Gonzalez-Navarro (2016).2 In this paper, we combine these two questions and
assess the income gains relative to the inequality costs of trade policy. Using survey data
for 54 developing countries, we explore the potential trade-off between the gains from trade
and the distribution of those gains and we provide a quantification of the inequality-adjusted
welfare gains from trade. The evaluation of this trade-off is important, especially because
free trade is often opposed on inequality grounds.
We develop a comprehensive model that describes how trade policy affects the real income
of different households. Tariffs determine domestic prices which affect households both as
consumers and as income earners. As consumers, households are affected through the cost
of the entire bundle of traded consumption goods. Similarly, household income is affected
through changes in the returns to household production activities, crop growing, family
businesses, labor earnings, and government transfers. Our model encompasses all these
mechanisms. Following Deaton (1989), we use a first order approximation to measure how
real income changes with trade protection or trade liberalization.
We then combine tariff data on various goods with household survey data on detailed
income and expenditure patterns to estimate these first order welfare effects for 54 low and
middle income countries. With estimates of the welfare effects of trade liberalization for
each household, we study the aggregate gains from trade (as in Arkolakis, Costinot and
Rodriguez-Clare, 2012) and the distribution of the gains from trade (as in Porto, 2006).
1See also Artuc, Lederman and Porto (2015), Caliendo and Parro (2015), Melitz and Redding (2015),
Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson and Rodriguez-Clare (2015), and Caliendo, Dvorkin and Parro (2016).
2See also Nicita, Olarreaga and Porto (2014), Faber (2014), Goldberg and Pavcnic (2007), Topalova
(2010), Kovak (2013), Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013), Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2017).
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Using an Atkinson Social Welfare function (Atkinson, 1970), we assess the trade-off between
the income gains and the inequality costs. Our joint study of the gains from trade and
their distribution across households contributes to an incipient strand of literature including
Antras, de Gortari and Itskhoki (2017) and Galle, Rodriguez-Clare and Yi (2017).
It is useful to put our methodological approach into context. Arkolakis, Costinot and
Rodriguez-Clare (2012) quantify the gains from trade by deriving a sufficient statistic to
compare autarky with the status quo. Subsequent literature has developed extensions
allowing for imperfect competition (Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson and Rodriguez-Clare,
2015), labor market frictions (Caliendo, Dvorkin and Parro, 2016), and productivity
advantages (Melitz and Redding, 2015). Work on the distributional effects identifies instead
winners and losers from trade. Much of this literature builds on Deaton’s (1989) first order
effects approach, both on expenditures and incomes. Porto (2006) studies the distribution
of the household welfare effects across the income distribution, Nicita, Olarreaga and Porto
(2014) explore the poverty bias of trade policy (the welfare effects of the poor relative to
the welfare effects of the rich), and Atkin, Faber and Gonzalez-Navarro (2016) investigate
the distribution of the household welfare effects from FDI. Another branch of the literature
examines distributional effects in a Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2012) setting.
Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2015) introduce non-homothetic preferences and focus on
expenditures only. Costinot, Donaldson and Komunjer (2012) and Galle, Rodriguez-Clare
and Yi (2017) adopt a Ricardo-Roy model and focus on both expenditures and wages. A
distinctive feature of this paper is that we merge these two approaches looking at both
average gains from trade and their distributional impacts.
We find average income gains from liberalization in 44 countries and average income losses
in the remainder 10 countries. On average, the developing countries in our study enjoy gains
from trade equivalent to 1.8 percent of real household expenditure. This is mostly because
the consumption gains from lower prices dominate the income losses from reduced protection.
The distributional impacts of liberalization are highly heterogeneous, across both
countries and households. We find that the equality gains, the change in social welfare
associated with these distributional impacts, are negatively correlated with the average
2
income gains. Inequality costs arise primarily because trade exacerbates nominal income
inequality, while the consumption gains tend to be more evenly spread. This creates tradeoffs
between the income gains and the equality gains in 46 of the 54 countries in our sample. Such
trade-offs are typically resolved in favor of lower tariffs. In 39 countries, liberalization would
result in inequality-adjusted welfare gains for a wide range of empirically plausible values of
inequality aversion. In 9 countries that face trade-offs, protectionism would instead be welfare
enhancing for plausible values of inequality aversion. Finally, there are 6 countries where
the trade-offs are acute, in which the presence of welfare gains or losses depends crucially
on the presumed level of inequality aversion and policy prescriptions are consequently more
equivocal. These results imply that in the majority of developing countries in our study, the
prevailing pattern of protection induces sizeable welfare losses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and derives
the formulas for the welfare effects of trade policy. Section 3 uses the tariff data and the
survey data to estimate those welfare effects in 54 countries. Section 4 discusses the gains
from trade and their distribution. Section 5 evaluates and quantifies the trade-off between
income gains and inequality costs of trade. In addition, it decomposes equality gains into
consumption equality gains and income equality gains. Section 6 concludes.
2 Tariffs and Household Welfare
In this section, we develop a detailed model that defines how trade protection affects the
real income of the household. We first discuss the determinants of household welfare before
turning to the impacts of tariff cuts.
2.1 Household Welfare
We adopt and extend the standard model of Deaton (1989), Porto (2005, 2006), and Nicita,
Olarreaga and Porto (2014). Following Dixit and Norman (1980) and Anderson and Neary
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(1996), to study household well-being we utilize the trade expenditure function, V h:
(1) V h(p, vh, uh) = yh(p, vh)− e(p, uh),
where h is the household index, yh(·) is the household income generating function, which
depends on a vector of prices p and on household endowments vh, and e(·) is the expenditure
function, which depends on prices and on the required utility uh. We use the trade
expenditure function V h because we are interested in the impact of trade on both incomes
and expenditures.3
Households consume traded and non-traded goods. Total expenditure is:
(2) e(pT ,pNT , uh) =
∑
j∈T
pjc
h
j +
∑
k∈NT
pkc
h
k,
where pT is the vector of traded goods prices pj, with consumption c
h
j , j ∈ T , and pNT is
the vector of non-traded goods prices pk with consumption c
h
k, k ∈ NT .
The household income generating function is given by:
(3) yh = lhw +
∑
j∈T
pihj (p
T ) +
∑
k∈NT
pihk (p
NT )− T h,
where lhw is labor income (which depends on wages), pi
h
j are farm profits obtained from
various household production activities j in traded sectors (such as sales of cotton, tobacco,
or maize), pihk are profits from non-traded family business activities, and T
h are taxes paid
to (or transfers received from) the government.4
The distinction between pihj and pi
h
k is conceptually useful. In the household surveys
of agrarian economies, as most of our sample countries are, households report two main
sources of agricultural sales income. Many households produce food crops (maize, wheat,
3Deaton (1989) uses the indirect utility function to measure household welfare but ignores the private
marginal utility of money, which is equivalent to working directly with the changes in real income, as we
do. An alternative representation using the household expenditure function leads to the same qualitative
approach. See Porto (2006).
4Because of data constraints, we do not deal with other types of transfers (e.g., remittances), nor with
savings.
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rice) and/or cash crops (cotton, tobacco, cocoa). Cash crops are sold directly in the market.
Food crops are often partly consumed by the household (this is autoconsumption), with the
surplus sold in the market. These sources of agricultural production income are included in
pihj . The household may also own a (small) business or family enterprise (basic agricultural
processing, small shops, odd-jobs). Income from sales of these activities is captured by pihk .
Furthermore, in equation (3), labor income includes wages earned in different activities in
both traded and non-traded sectors (e.g., manufacturing, services, retail trade, government).
Earnings from self-employed activities are included in pihj or pi
h
k , depending on whether or
not the good in question is tradable.5
Our coverage of income sources embeds the analysis in different papers of this literature.
Deaton (1989) and Benjamin and Deaton (1993) work with income earned from sales of
agricultural production (rice in Thailand and cocoa and coffee in Coˆte d’Ivoire, respectively).
Porto (2006) introduces wage income. Nicita, Olarreaga and Porto (2014) investigate sales of
agricultural products and wages. Atkin, Faber and Gonzalez-Navarro (2016) use income from
family enterprises. This paper covers all these activities including agricultural sales income,
labor earnings, income earned in household enterprises in traded sectors, and government
transfers.
2.2 The Impacts of Tariff Changes
As most of the related literature does, we adopt a two-step approach. In the first step,
trade policy affects the prices of traded goods. In the second step, the induced changes in
the prices of traded goods affect household expenditures in all goods and incomes from all
activities.
To see how the first step works, let τi be the instrument of trade protection for sector i.
We assume that the country is small and thus faces exogenously given international prices p∗i .
Throughout the analysis, we assume perfect price transmission (i.e., unitary pass-through
5Consider a household that produces tomatoes, selling some in the market and using the rest to prepare
tomatoes sauce through a household enterprise. Sales of (raw) tomatoes are classified as agricultural profits
affected by tariffs on tomatoes; sales of tomato sauce are categorized as enterprise income and are affected
by tariffs on processed food products. A worker employed by a tomato sauce producer earns wages in the
food sector, whereas someone employed by a street tomato vendor earns wages in retail trade.
5
elasticities) from tariffs to domestic prices.6 As a result:
(4) d ln pi =
1
1 + τi
dτi.
If full trade liberalization is assumed so that dτi = −τi;
(5) d ln pi = −τi/(1 + τi).
In the second step, these price changes create impacts on household expenditures on traded
goods via eh = e(pT , ·) and on household income via profits from enterprises in traded
sectors, pihi = pii(p
T , ·), and labor income lhw . There are also impacts on tariff revenue and
thus on household transfers T h.
To derive the welfare impacts of the changes in tariffs, differentiate (1) with respect to τi
to get:
(6)
dV hi
eh
= −
(
−shi + φhw
∂lh
∂pi
pi
lh
+ φhi
)
τi
1 + τi
+ Ψhi ,
where shi is the share of traded good i in the consumption bundle of household h, φ
h
i is
the income share derived from the sales of traded good i, φhw is the share of labor income,
(∂lh/∂pi)/(pi/l
h) is the elasticity of labor income of household h with respect to prices pi;
and Ψhi = dT
h/eh is the amount of income tax dT h (relative to household expenditure or
income) needed to compensate for the loss of government revenue incurred by eliminating
tariffs.
The interpretation of this equation is straightforward. After a price change caused by
tariff cuts d ln pi = −τi/(1+τi), the first order effects on real income can be well-approximated
with the corresponding expenditure and income shares. In the language of Deaton (1989),
because we are working with tariff cuts and price declines, net-consumers benefit while
net-producers suffer. In our setting, the net position of a household is defined in an extended
6We assume perfect price transmission because we do not have data to estimate the pass-through
elasticities. Our assumption does not imply that world, producer and consumer prices are equal, but simply
that they are proportional to each other. See Nicita (2009) and Ural Marchand (2012) for estimates of
imperfect pass-through.
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model including not only consumption and production of traded goods but also labor income,
enterprise income and government transfers. Note that equation (6) is actually the (negative
of the) compensating variation, the monetary transfer that would allow household h to attain
utility uh without tariffs.
As in Nicita, Olarreaga and Porto (2014), we want a measure of the welfare effects
generated by the entire structure of tariff protection. To obtain it, we sum the changes in
welfare in (6) over all traded goods i to get:
(7) V̂ h =
dV h
eh
=
∑
i
dV hi
eh
,
where V̂ h is the proportional change in household real income. In the remainder of the
paper, we estimate the different components of equation (7) and study them in detail. We
also use equation (7) to build ex-post counterfactual distributions. Let xh0 be the observed,
ex-ante level of real household income (from the data compiled in the household surveys).
The counterfactual real income x̂h1 is
(8) x̂h1 = x
h
0(1 + V̂
h).
Much of what we do below hinges on the comparison of the ex-ante and ex-post distributions
of income.
3 Estimating the Welfare Impacts of Trade Policy
To estimate the welfare impacts of trade policy, we need to measure the different components
of equations (6) and (7). The data needed to estimate impacts on consumption and
production of traded goods, labor income and home enterprise income can be found in
standard household surveys. Trade policy and trade policy data come from United Nations
COMTRADE and UNCTAD TRAINS, which classify goods using the Harmonized System
(HS) so that tariffs and imports are available at HS-6 level. Household surveys use different
nomenclatures of goods produced and consumed. To match trade data and household
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survey data, we use and improve upon the templates and concordances developed by Nicita,
Olarreaga and Porto (2014). In short, we first aggregate goods in the household surveys to
2-digit and 4-digit categories. We then aggregate tariff and trade data from COMTRADE
to those categories. See Appendix A for details.
3.1 Trade Policy and Price Changes
In the empirical application that follows, good i represents one of the product classifications
from the expenditure, income and home-consumption templates modules of the household
surveys. Each of these classifications includes many finer product groups from the HS
classification. We compute weighted average tariff rates τi for each of our survey categories:
(9) τi =
∑
c,n∈i
τc,n
mc,n∑
c,n∈imc,n
,
where n is an HS-category that belongs to survey-category i and mc,n are imports of good
n from country c. The results are shown in Table 1. We report the average tariff for
our 2-digit classification, Staple Agriculture, Non-Staple Agriculture, and Manufactures.
Average tariffs are highest for non-staple agricultural goods (14.4 percent). They are lower
for staple agricultural goods (10.8 percent) and manufactures (10.9 percent). These averages
mask substantial variation in trade barriers across countries. Average tariffs on non-staple
agricultural goods range from as high as 46.1 percent in Bhutan to as low as 1.9 percent in
Indonesia. Also, countries with higher tariffs in agriculture (staple and non-staple) tend to
have higher tariffs on manufactures as well.
Using the full price transmission assumption (equation 5), we calculate the price changes
induced by the elimination of tariffs as follows:
(10) ∆ ln pi =
p∗i − p∗i (1 + τi)
p∗i (1 + τi)
= − τi
1 + τi
.
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3.2 Expenditure and Income Shares
To measure the first order welfare effects we retrieve the expenditure shares shi and the
income shares φhi from the household survey modules. Appendix Table A1 lists the countries
included in the analysis, together with the corresponding household survey, the year of
the survey and the sample size. Our analysis covers all low income countries for which
appropriate household survey data were available, as well as the majority of lower middle
income countries. To minimize the role of measurement error, we exclude households in
the top and bottom 0.5% of the status quo expenditure distribution in all our analyses.
All statistics derived from household surveys presented in the remainder of the paper are
weighted using survey weights. For the relatively few surveys for which survey weights are
not available, we simply assume each household has the same weight.
Expenditure shares are reported in Table 2. We show averages for six major expenditure
aggregates, namely Staple Agriculture, Non-Staple Agriculture, Manufactured Goods,
Non-Traded Goods, Other Goods, and Home Consumption. Expenditure on food is the
dominant expenditure category, accounting on average for 45 percent of all household
spending across countries, which is not surprising since the bulk of countries in our sample
are low income countries with an average poverty rate of 35 percent (using national poverty
lines) and an average GDP per capita of 1879 USD. This focus on poor countries also helps
explain why home consumption is important, accounting for an average budget share of 17
percent across countries and for more than a third of all expenditure in Ethiopia, Madagascar,
Mali and Uzbekistan. Spending on manufacturing goods on average accounts for 17 percent
of overall household expenditure, and spending on non-tradables accounts for 15 percent.
Average income shares for staple Agriculture income, Non-Staple Agricultural income,
Wages, Family Enterprise Income, Other income, and Own Home Production are reported
in Table 3. Wage income is the single most important source of income, accounting on
average for 29 percent of household income across countries. The value of autoconsumption
accounts for 23 percent of household income. Profits from running farms and other family
businesses account for 17 and 13 percent of household income, respectively. These averages
hide important heterogeneity across countries, which reflects differences in structural features
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of their economies and heterogeneity in survey design (including coverage of different sources
of incomes and expenditures).
3.3 Labor Income and Transfers
In order to assess impacts on labor incomes and government revenues, we adopt a simple
modeling approach. For labor income, we assume that labor supply to a given sector is fixed.
This is consistent with a short-run model, in which workers cannot move across sectors and
households do not adjust to the trade shock. In this setting, the change in prices transmit
one to one to nominal wages and the elasticity of the wage in sector i with respect to its
own price pi is one, while the elasticities with respect to other prices j is zero. We explore
an alternative model in the Appendix. We consider 10 different sectors (see the Income
Template in the Appendix).7
To estimate the redistribution of the tariff revenue loss, Ψhi , we also follow a simple
approach. Denoting import quantity by mi, we can approximate the loss of tariff revenue as
dRi = −τip∗imi (ignoring production and consumption responses). Assuming a proportional
income tax, the change in income tax paid by household h is dT h = dψyh, where dψ is the
compensatory change in the tax rate. Consequently,
(11) Ψhi = −
τi
1 + τi
Mi∑
h y
h
,
where Mi = p
∗
i (1 + τi)mi is the value of imports.
4 Income Gains and Inequality Costs of Trade Policy
In this section, we investigate the potential income gains (or losses) and the potential
inequality costs (or gains) from trade liberalization. The next section (section 5) investigates
the potential trade-off between the two.
7Concretely, we construct a dynamic model with labor mobility costs that is characterized by inter
industry wage differences (following Artuc, Chaudhuri and McLaren, 2010; Dix-Carneiro, 2014).
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4.1 Income Gains from Trade
To be consistent with the literature (e.g., Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare, 2012),
the gains from trade G are defined as the proportional change in aggregate household real
expenditures, after liberalization:
(12) G =
∑
h(x
h
1 − xh0)∑
h x
h
0
=
∑
h
xh0∑
h x
h
0
V̂ h,
where V̂ h is the proportional change in real expenditures of household h which we estimate
with equation (7). Thus, G is a weighted average of the welfare effects V̂ h.
Table 4 reports G for 44 countries with positive aggregate gains from trade (G > 0).
On average, the net gain from tariff liberalization is a 2.5 percentage point increase in real
expenditures. The highest gains accrue to Cameroon and Zambia (6.8 and 5.8 percent of
real expenditure, respectively). The smallest gains, for Bangladesh and Burundi, are about
0.4 percent of initial expenditures.
Table 5 reports 10 countries in which trade liberalization causes losses (G < 0) which
average -0.9 percent of real expenditures. In Cambodia, the country with the largest loss,
households are estimated to lose 3.1 percentage points of real expenditure. There are also
instances of very small, almost negligible, losses as in Mongolia.
Across all countries in the sample, the average gain from trade liberalization is equal to
1.8 percent of real expenditures. The developing world seems to gain from trade.
To establish the sources of the gains from trade, we decompose the average gains into
different channels in columns 2-8 of Tables 4 and 5. Households gain on the expenditure
side, but they lose on the income side. The consumption gains come from lower prices
of tradables, which on average result in (gross) real income gains of 6.4 percent for the
winners (Table 4) and 5.1 percent for the losers (Table 5). About two thirds of these gains,
on average, are due to lower prices of agricultural goods and one third to lower prices of
manufacturing goods. This is a consequence both of the higher expenditure shares on food
items in developing countries, and the comparatively high tariffs on agricultural products.
Households lose nominal income. Agricultural income losses account for average real income
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declines of 1.6 percent across countries with gains and 1.9 percent across countries with losses.
Wage income effects create losses of 0.6 percent in countries with gains and 1.0 percent in
countries with losses. The reduction in income from enterprises producing tradeable goods
is small on average; -0.2 percent of income among winners and -0.1 percent among countries
that lose. The biggest driver of income losses is the reduction in government revenue: this
channel accounts for 1.5 of the 3.9 percentage points loss in income among winners and 3.1
of the 6.1 percentage point loss among losers.
4.2 The Distributional Effects of Trade
We now turn to the distribution of the gains from the trade, which have been the focus of
Porto (2006), Nicita, Olarreaga and Porto (2014), Fajgelbaum and Khandelwal (2016), Atkin,
Faber and Gonzalez-Navarro (2016), Faber (2014) and Atkin and Donaldson (2015). Indeed,
the average impacts just discussed mask significant heterogeneity across households. This
is because the net welfare impact is determined by a combination of initial tariffs as well as
income and consumption portfolios. We combine two techniques to explore the distributional
effects. We estimate kernel averages of the gains from trade, conditional on household initial
well-being (per capita expenditure), and we estimate bivariate kernel densities of the joint
distribution of the gains from trade and household per capita expenditure.
For the sake of exposition, we divide countries into two groups using the pro-poor
index of Nicita, Olarreaga and Porto (2014). In our application, the pro-poor index is the
difference between the average gains for the poor—the bottom 20 percent of the income
distribution—and the rich—the top 20 percent. If the index is positive the poor gain
proportionately more (or lose proportionately less) than the rich, while the opposite happens
when the index is negative. According to this classification, trade liberalization would be
pro-poor in 17 countries, while it would be pro-rich in the remaining 37 countries.
We illustrate the case of pro-poor bias in Figure 1 for the cases of Jordan (panel (a))
and Mauritania (panel (b)). Appendix B provides figures for all countries. In Jordan, the
kernel average is positive everywhere, so that there are average gains from trade across
the income distribution, but the slope of the kernel regression is negative (so that the
12
poor gain proportionately more than the rich). This pro-poor bias with positive kernel
average gains appears in Azerbaijan, Central African Republic, Ecuador, Indonesia, Moldova,
Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Yemen and Zambia (see Appendix B). In
these countries, liberalization raises incomes across the income distribution and may reduce
inequality. Liberalization would not be Pareto improving, however. The bivariate density of
the welfare effects and initial income illustrates the dispersion in the welfare effects and the
existence of winners and losers in all segments of the per capita expenditure spectrum. A
more extreme version of this pattern is shown in panel (b) for the case of Mauritania, where
there are average gains for the poor but average losses for the rich. This implies a very
strong pro-poor bias. Similar patterns are also observed in Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mongolia
and Sri Lanka (see Appendix B). In all these countries, liberalization raises average income
and may reduce inequality significantly.
We illustrate the pro-rich bias in Figure 2. In Uzbekistan (panel (a)), the kernel
average is always positive at all levels of per capita expenditure, and the slope of the kernel
regression is positive, indicating that, on average, the rich gain proportionately more than
the poor. Again, some individual households stand to lose, as the underlying bivariate kernel
density graph shows. Liberalization lifts incomes throughout the income distribution, but at
the expense of potentially higher inequality. This pattern is found in Armenia, Bolivia,
Cameroon, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala, Guinea, Iraq, Kyrgyz
Republic, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Sierra Leone, South Africa,
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Ukraine (see Appendix B). The case of pro-rich bias
with average gains for the richest households and losses for the poorest is illustrated in panel
(b) for Togo. Liberalization is strongly pro-rich and inequality significantly exacerbated.
Similar patterns arise in Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, The Gambia, Kenya,
Nigeria, and Vietnam. In panel (c), we show the case of average losses and a pro-rich bias
for Ghana. In this country, as well as in Bhutan, Cambodia, Comoros and Madagascar, the
poor lose proportionately more than the rich. This is a scenario with average losses as well
as increased inequality.
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5 The Trade-Off between Income Gains and Inequality
Costs
Given the patterns of gains from trade and of the distribution of those gains, we now
assess whether there is a trade-off between the income gains and the inequality costs of
trade liberalization. This necessarily involves value judgements because different societies,
individuals or policy makers may value the gains or losses of some households differently. A
tool to describe the trade-off between income inequality and average incomes is the Atkinson
social welfare function (Atkinson, 1970):
(13) W =
1
H
∑
h
(
xh
)1−ε
1− ε ,
where W is social welfare and ε 6= 1 is a parameter that measures the dislike for inequality.8
When ε=0, every household counts the same and social welfare is just the sum (average)
of per capita expenditures. As ε increases, the weights attached to the wellbeing of poorer
households increases. In the limit, as ε approaches infinity social welfare is determined by
the wellbeing of the very poorest household (as in a Rawlsian social welfare function). It is
very important to interpret the Atkinson social welfare function correctly. As Deaton (1997)
explains, W in (13) is not necessarily (and more precisely, it seldom is) the object that
policymakers maximize when choosing among policy options. Rather, it provides a means of
quantifying potential tensions between mean income and its distribution across households.
An important property of the Atkinson social welfare function is that it can be
decomposed in a way that is conducive to the assessment of this trade-off. Concretely,
we can write
(14) W = µ ∗ (1− I),
8For completeness, when ε = 1, we define lnW = (1/H)
∑
h lnx
h
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where µ is mean income and
(15) I = 1−
(
1
H
H∑
h=1
(xh/µ)1−ε
)1/(1−ε)
,
is an implicit measure of income inequality. Social welfare thus depends on average income
µ and on the aggregate level of “equality” (1− I(ε)). This measure of inequality I(ε) (or the
measure of equality (1−I(ε))) depends on ε and nests a whole family of inequality measures.
Using W (ε), we can define a measure of the gains from trade that includes a correction
for the inequality costs:
(16) G(ε) =
W1(ε)−W0(ε)
W0(ε)
,
where W0 is the ex-ante social welfare, calculated with the observed (x
h
0) income distribution
in the presence of trade protection and W1(ε) is the counterfactual social welfare under trade
liberalization (x̂h1). Given the initial situation and the post-liberalization situation, we can
compare W0 and W1 using (16). For ε = 0, this is a comparison of mean income, that is, the
calculation of the gains from trade (Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez Clare, 2012; Costinot,
Donaldson and Komunjer, 2012; Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare, 2014; Artuc, Lederman and
Porto, 2015; Caliendo and Parro, 2015; Melitz and Redding, 2015; Arkolakis, Costinot,
Donaldson and Rodriguez-Clare, 2015; and Caliendo, Dvorkin and Parro, 2015). For ε > 0,
this comparison involves the calculation of the gains from trade with an implicit correction
for inequality (Antras, de Gortari, Itskhoki, 2017; and Galle, Rodriguez-Clare, and Yi, 2017).
With estimates of G(ε) for different ε, we can establish whether there is a trade-off between
the gains in average incomes and the costs of inequality in its distribution, we can quantify
this trade-off, and we can assess it.
For the discussion that follows, we exploit the decomposition of W in equation (14). Note
that we can write
(17) G(ε) = G(0) +
µ1
µ0
I0(ε)− I1(ε)
1− I0(ε) .
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The inequality-adjusted gains from trade are thus equal to the income gains from trade
G(0) plus a correction for changes in inequality, which we will refer to as equality gains.
The gains from trade G(0) can be positive or negative, as shown in section 4.1. The
correction for inequality is governed by the Atkinson inequality index I(ε), which may depend
non-monotonically on ε. If inequality increases for some εa > 0 so that I1(εa) > I0(εa), then
G(εa) incorporates a downward correction for these inequality costs. Conversely, if I1 < I0
at some εb, then the gains from trade are amplified. Note that G(ε) > 0 does not imply no
inequality costs per se but rather that their welfare impacts are dominated by the income
gains.
Trade-offs arise when income gains and equality gains move in opposite directions, i.e.
when G(0) and µ1
µ0
I0(ε)−I1(ε)
1−I0(ε) have opposite signs. This is the case in countries where trade
exacerbates inequality but improves average income, and in countries where it reduces
inequality at the expense of lowering mean income. In some countries, these trade-offs
can even result in reversals of trade policy preferences, in the sense that for certain levels
of inequality aversion ε, the inequality adjusted gains from trade may be negative (positive)
even though liberalization leads to an increase (reduction) in average income. Since the sign
and magnitude of the equality gains can vary with ε both the existence and acuteness of
the trade-offs depend on the level of inequality aversion. No trade-offs occur in countries
where liberalization leads to both income and equality gains (for all ε) or in countries where
it leads to lower income and higher inequality (for all ε).
One of the main findings of our paper is the high prevalence of trade-offs between average
incomes and income inequality in the developing world. Among the 54 countries in our
sample, 46 face a trade-off and only 8 do not. In 28 of the 46 countries the tradeoffs can
be severe enough to generate (potential) reversals in the ranking of trade policy preferences.
We first present countries without trade-offs in section 5.1, before discussing countries with
trade-offs without trade policy preference reversals 5.2. Section 5.3 presents countries with
trade-offs that can generate trade policy preference reversals. Section 5.4 evaluates such
trade-offs, whereas section 5.5 decomposes equality gains into consumption and income
equality gains.
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5.1 No Trade-off Countries
When average income gains emerge together with equality gains, there is no trade-off. The
case of the Central African Republic is shown in Figure 3, which plots G(ε) for ε ∈ [0, 10].9
To obtain confidence intervals for G(ε) we resample from the observed distribution and
bootstrap using 1000 replications. In the Central African Republic, liberalization leads to
average welfare gains with a pro-poor bias. The gains in average incomes of 4.2 percent are
independent of ε and the pro-poor bias implies that liberalization also leads to equality gains.
As ε increases and more weight is put on the poor, these equality gains actually get bigger.
As a result, the inequality adjusted welfare gains are increasing in the inequality aversion
parameter ε, and exceed 6 percent for large ε. Other countries in which liberalization yields
both equality gains and lifts average incomes are Guinea Bissau, Jordan and Yemen. In
these countries, liberalization is unambiguously social welfare enhancing.
At the other end of the spectrum lie 4 countries, Comoros, Ghana, Madagascar and
Rwanda, which are characterized by average income losses and inequality costs for all ε. In
these countries liberalization would be unambiguously social welfare depressing. Figure 4
illustrates the case of Ghana. Since income losses are disproportionately borne by the poor,
the inequality adjusted gains from trade are negative and decreasing with ε. For instance,
the aggregate losses of –2.0 percent (for ε = 0) are augmented to over –4.2 percent when
inequality aversion is high.
5.2 Trade-off Countries without Trade Policy Preference
Reversals
There are 46 countries with evidence of a trade-off. In 18 countries, this trade-off is not strong
enough to generate reversals of trade policy preferences because liberalization dominates
protection at all levels of inequality aversion (in 16 countries) or because protection dominates
liberalization (in only 2 countries, notably Bhutan and Cambodia). Figure 5 illustrates the
case of Uzbekistan, where liberalization creates average income gains at the expense of
9For presentational purposes, we examine G(ε) for a limited range of ε ∈ [0, 10] but the results hold more
generally. Results are available upon request but omitted to conserve space.
17
inequality costs. In Uzbekistan inequality increases smoothly with ε and, as a consequence,
the inequality adjusted welfare gains G(ε) decrease as inequality aversion rises. The gains
from trade are G(0) = 3.3 percent, while the inequality-adjusted gains for large ε can go
down to about only 1 percent. Other countries exhibiting a similar pattern are Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Egypt, Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova,
Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, South Africa, and Zambia. Since G(ε)
is positive and statistically significant for all ε, liberalization would unambiguously lead to
higher social welfare.
Plots of G(ε) for all these countries are given in Appendix C. We summarize the
information contained in Figures 3, 4 and 5 in Table 6, which reports the income gains
from trade G(0) (column 1) as well as the equality gains ((µ1/µ0)(I0(ε)− I1(ε))/(1− I0(ε))
for several values of inequality aversion ε. To illustrate, consider the case of Guinea Bissau
(a country without a trade-off) in panel (a). The gains from trade are 2.0 percent (column
1). Because inequality declines with liberalization, the equality gains increase with ε. The
correction is thus positive and increasing with ε. At ε = 2, for instance, the correction is
0.5 percent and the inequality-adjusted gains are 2.5 percent. At ε = 7, the correction is 1.5
percent and the total inequality-adjusted gains go up to 3.5 percent. Another interesting
example is Madagascar, where there are losses from trade of −1.1 percent and increases in
inequality costs so that, at ε = 2, the inequality-adjusted losses from trade drop to −2.3
percent and at ε = 7, to −3.4 percent. To illustrate a country with trade-offs (Panel (b)),
consider Tajikistan. The gains from trade are 1.9 percent, but inequality increases and
consequently there is a downward correction to G. At ε = 2, this correction is –0.1 percent
and the inequality adjusted gains drop to 1.8; at ε = 7, the correction is –0.7 percent and
the inequality adjusted total gains are 1.2 percent. The table reports many other interesting
patterns.
5.3 Trade-off Countries with Trade Policy Preference Reversals
In the remaining 28 countries in our sample, we find evidence of a stronger trade-off which
may induce a potential reversal of the ranking of trade policy preferences. This reversal
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occurs when G(ε) changes sign, going from positive to negative or from negative to positive,
as ε increases. This means that, depending on the value judgement parameter ε, the social
welfare function points to welfare gains associated with trade liberalization or with trade
protection. Figure 6 and 7 shows two examples of the existence of such trade-offs. In
Benin (Figure 6), there are significant average income gains of 2.2 percent so that G(0) > 0.
However, as ε increases, trade liberalization creates larger and larger inequality costs so that,
eventually, G(ε) becomes significantly negative. At very large ε, the inequality-adjusted gains
approach−4.5 percent. It follows that free trade dominates protection when ε is low, whereas
protection dominates free trade when ε is high. Other countries that exhibit similar tradeoffs
are Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Guatemala, Kenya,
Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Togo, and Vietnam.10
Mali (Figure 7) exhibits the opposite pattern; There are significant average losses from
trade (G(0) = −0.4) but, as ε increases, the equality gains from liberalization end up strictly
dominating those losses and the inequality-adjusted gains G(ε) can reach over 3 percent.
Consequently, protection dominates free trade at low ε, while free trade dominates protection
at high ε. This also happens in Mauritania and Sri Lanka.
To quantify these policy preference reversals, we define the cutoff value ε∗ such that
G(ε∗) = 0. The cutoff ε∗, which we refer to as trade-ε∗, is a measure of the inequality
aversion to trade liberalization. It is a sufficient statistic to describe the trade-off between
mean income and inequality in the presence of trade policy preference reversals. Defining
the trade-off in terms of the gains, the value of ε∗ shows how intolerant towards inequality
a society would have to be in order to make the gains from trade not worthwhile from a
social welfare perspective.11 A high value of ε∗ implies a soft trade-off: a society needs to
put a heavy weight on the cost of higher inequality to be willing to forgo the gains (always
in a social welfare function sense). In the limit case, when trade-ε∗ tends to infinity or when
trade-ε∗ does not exist (as in the countries discussed in sections 5.1 and 5.2), there is no
reversal in trade policy preference rankings and, given gains from trade, trade liberalization
10See below for a more detailed discussion of some of these countries and their trade-off.
11Alternatively, the ε∗ shows how much a society would have to value equality to forgo the average gains
from trade.
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leads to higher social welfare for any ε. By contrast, a low trade-ε∗ implies a very hard
trade-off because relatively light weights on the inequality costs are enough to offset the
gains from trade. It is important to note that while the value of ε∗ describes the nature of
the trade-off, it is silent about whether this trade-off is socially acceptable.
Table 7 presents estimates of the trade-ε∗ (column 1) and its 95% confidence interval
(columns 2 and 3). Since the interpretation of the trade-ε∗ depends on the sign of the gains,
we report results separately for countries that enjoy income gains in panel (a) and countries
that suffer income losses in panel (b). The select few countries characterized by multiple
(potential) reversals are presented in panel (c).
Among the countries with gains (Panel (a)), the trade-ε∗ vary a lot. In some cases, the
cutoff can be as low as 0.10 (Burundi), 0.51 (Bangladesh) or 0.56 (Burkina Faso). In other
cases, it can be much larger, as in Malawi (7.06) or Guatemala (6.98). To put these numbers
in perspective, we canvassed the literature for guidance on what a reasonable value for ε
is. Deaton (1997) recommends exploring values of ε ∈ [0, 2] when doing policy evaluations.
Using experiments, Carlsson, Daruvala and Johansson-Stenman (2005) estimate ε ∈ [1, 2]
and Layard, Mayraz and Nickell (2008) estimate a value of ε of 1.26. A high ε∗ consequently
suggests that the trade-offs are soft in the sense that one would have to be implausibly
inequality averse in order not to prefer liberalization. This implies a strong presumption in
favor of lower tariffs. By contrast, in Burundi, Bangladesh or Burkina Faso, the trade-off
would be quite stark. Since the gains from trade are positive but very small, even at low levels
of inequality aversion one would prefer protection. In the remaining countries, the trade-off
appears to be more moderate, with a substantial number of the estimates of trade-ε lying
in the [1,2] interval (1.17 in The Gambia, 1.23 in Togo, 1.47 in Benin, 1.87 in Nigeria, and
1.91 in Vietnam). Kenya (2.49), Ethiopia (3.06), Mozambique (3.51), Liberia (4.41), Papua
New Guinea (4.79), and Bolivia (5.81 at the first reversal) are countries with relatively high
trade-ε∗, but not quite as extreme as Malawi or Guatemala.
There are countries with trade-offs where the evidence on trade policy reversals is not so
compelling. This occurs when the inequality-adjusted gains from trade are not statistically
indistinguishable from zero, that is the null hypothesis that G(ε) = 0 cannot be rejected
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for a range of ε. We report these cases in columns 4 and 5 of Table 7. In Sierra Leone,
for instance, for ε > 4.01, there are inequality adjusted gains from trade (G(ε) > 0) that
are not statistically different from 0. Consequently, we cannot rule out a potential reversal
(from preferring liberalization to preferring protection). Similar scenarios emerge in Niger
(ε > 6.01), Nicaragua (ε > 6.33), Coˆte d’Ivoire (ε > 7.02), Georgia (ε > 7.09), Nepal
(ε > 8.79), Tanzania (ε > 8.85), and Ecuador (ε > 9.92). In all these countries, however,
the trade policy preference reversal would come about only for levels of inequality aversion
that are arguably implausibly large.
Among the countries with aggregate losses (Panel (b)) of Table 7), the estimated trade-ε
tend to be low. For instance, we get ε∗ = 0.05 in Mongolia, ε∗ = 0.30 in Sri Lanka (at the
first reversal) and ε∗ = 0.43 in Mali. Note that the interpretation in these cases is different
because for low ε, trade protection is preferred to liberalization, and, conversely, liberalization
is preferred to protection for higher ε. In these countries, a low ε∗ thus implies a presumption
in favor of lower tariffs, too (assuming plausible, non-zero, levels of inequality aversion). In
Mauritania (ε∗ = 1.63), trade protection would be preferred under more moderate values of
inequality aversion making it harder to infer trade policy prescriptions.
5.4 Assessment
While our results attest to highly heterogeneous welfare impacts of trade liberalization across
households and countries, overall the analysis provides overwhelming evidence of a trade-off
between income gains and inequality costs of trade policy. In most cases, however, this
trade-off is resolved in favor of freer trade. We summarize these observations and results
in Figure 8. We plot the value of the inequality-adjust gains from trade G(ε) against the
gains from trade G(0). For our assessment, we use ε = 1.5 because it is in the middle of the
empirically plausible interval [1, 2] and because it yields a measure of the Atkison inequality
index I that is, in general, close to the Gini coefficient. Since the Gini is often used in
discussions about inequality, this is a useful benchmark. If there were only small corrections
for inequality, then the pairs (G(1.5), G(0)) would lie along the 45 degree line, with larger
corrections for those pairs further away. Orthant I hosts countries with average gains as well
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as gains after inequality corrections; orthant III hosts countries with average losses with and
without inequality corrections. In orthant II, we see countries with losses from trade that
turn into gains after the inequality adjustments, and, in orthant IV, those countries with
gains from trade that turn into losses with inequality considerations.
For an inequality aversion parameter of ε = 1.5, 16 countries would not face a trade-off.
Ten of them would unambiguously benefit from liberalization as they enjoy both income
and inequality gains. These countries, which lie in orthant I, above the 45 degree line, are
Azerbaijan, Central African Republic, Ecuador, Guinea Bissau, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan,
Papua New Guinea, Nepal, and Yemen. The remaining six countries, Bhutan, Cambodia,
Comoros, Ghana, Madagascar and Rwanda, would unambiguously prefer protectionism as
trade liberalization leads to both income losses and inequality costs (they lie in orthant III,
below the 45 degree line).
A total of 38 countries would exhibit trade-offs (for ε = 1.5). In 31 countries, the
trade-off is resolved in favor of liberalization. Twenty eight countries would show income
gains and inequality costs, but inequality-adjusted gains from trade liberalization. These
are the countries in orthant I, below the 45 degree line. Three countries (Mali, Sri Lanka,
Mongolia) would show instead income losses but sufficient high equality gains so that there
are inequality-adjusted gains from trade in the end (for ε = 1.5). These are countries in
orthant II.
In 7 countries the trade-off is instead resolved in favor of protection because tariffs lead
to higher inequality-adjusted welfare. One country, Mauritania (orthant III, above the 45
degree line), would face income losses and equality gains, which, for ε = 1.5, are not enough
to compensate for those losses. In six countries, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
The Gambia and Togo, the inequality costs dominate the income gains. These are in orthant
IV.
It turns out that the resolution of the trade-off is very stable for different values of
plausible inequality aversion. In Figure 9, we reproduce Figure 8 for ε = 1 (panel (a)) and
ε = 2 (panel (b)). As it can be seen, there are only a few countries where the trade policy
prescriptions are more equivocal. For ε = 1, Benin, The Gambia, and Togo jump from
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orthant IV to orthant I (thus preferring liberalization instead of protection). For ε = 2,
Vietnam and Nigeria jump from orthant I to orthant IV (thus preferring protection) while
Mauritania jumps from orthant III to orthant II (thus preferring liberalization).
A fundamental conclusion of this analysis is therefore that the potential trade-off between
mean income and its distribution resolves, in many instances, in favor of lower tariffs
(liberalization) rather than higher tariffs (protection). Concretely, for empirically plausible
levels of inequality aversion, liberalization is expected to enhance welfare in 39 countries and
to reduce it in 9 countries. Only in the remaining 6 countries are the policy implications
more equivocal.
These results raise questions about why these countries protect their economies. While
our analysis does not inform us about this issue, potential reasons include political economy
considerations, rent re-distribution to non-labor income (capital), and tariff revenue capture
(Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Krueger, 1974) as well as the need for government revenue in
countries in which income taxes are difficult to collect (Besley and Persson, 2013). Theories
of social mobility and redistribution that combine psychology and political economy may
also help explain protectionism (Picketty, 1995; Benabou and Tirole, 2006). Whatever the
reason for it, protection can be very costly in terms of the social welfare aggregator W . In the
Appendix we show that this conclusion and the qualitative pattern of results are robust to
using an alternative model that allows for labor market frictions and responses of non-traded
goods prices.
5.5 Decomposing Equality Gains
How do the trade-offs described above emerge? To answer this question, Table 8 decomposes
the equality gains (or losses) into consumption equality gains and (nominal) income
equality gains. To calculate these, we estimate two counterfactual scenarios; one in which
liberalization solely impacts consumption (and does not impact income), and one in which
it solely impacts income (and does not impact consumption). We compute the consumption
and income equality components using equation (17) (recall that equality gains are equal to
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µ1
µ0
I0(ε)−I1(ε)
1−I0(ε) ).
12
As much as there is heterogeneity in the trade-offs, there is a marked heterogeneity in
the income and consumption equality components. Note, however, that the consumption
equality gains are positive yet small in the majority of countries. As consumers, the poor
seem to benefit disproportionately from liberalization, in part because they spend a larger
share of their budget on food items, which are subject to comparatively high tariffs. By
contrast, the income component is overwhelmingly negative across countries, reflecting the
fact that trade liberalization creates income inequality costs that are disproportionately
borne by poorer households. Whereas the consumption equality gains on average increase
only slightly as inequality aversion rises, the average income inequality costs tend to sharply
increase (i.e., become more negative) with ε. The trade-offs between the aggregate gains and
aggregate inequality costs are thus predominantly driven by income inequality. This finding
shows that the income losses associated with trade liberalization are borne disproportionately
by the poorer segment of the income distribution, whereas the consumption gains are more
widely spread.
6 Conclusion
Using household survey data for 54 low and middle income countries harmonized with trade
and tariff data, this paper offers a quantitative assessment of the income gains and inequality
costs of trade liberalization and the potential tradeoff between them.
A stylized yet comprehensive model that allows for a rich range of first order effects on
household consumption and income is used to quantify welfare gains or losses for households
in different parts of the expenditure distribution. These welfare impacts are subsequently
explored by deploying the Atkinson social welfare function that allows us to decompose
inequality adjusted gains into aggregate gains and equality (distributional) gains.
12Consumption and income impacts may interact, such that the total equality gains from trade are not
simply equal to the sum of the consumption equality gains and income equality gains; to assess the importance
of these type of interaction effects, we calculated ”residual” equality gains as the difference between total
equality gains and the sum of income and consumption equality gains. The residual was typically very small
and is therefore not presented here.
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Liberalization is estimated to lead to income gains in 44 countries in our study, and
to income losses in 10 countries. The developing world as a whole would enjoy gains
of about 1.8 percent of real household expenditures, on average. These income gains are
negatively correlated with equality gains, such that liberalization typically entails a trade-off
between average incomes and income inequality. In fact, such trade-offs arise in 46 out of 54
countries, and are primarily the result of trade exacerbating income inequality. By contrast,
consumption gains tend to be more evenly spread across households.
While trade-offs are prevalent, our findings also suggest that liberalization would be
welfare enhancing in the vast majority of countries in our study: in a large part of the
developing world, the current structure of tariff protection is inducing sizeable welfare losses.
Explaining what drives these patterns is beyond the scope of this paper but an interesting
avenue for future research.
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Figure 1
Patterns of Distributional Impacts
Pro-Poor Bias
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Notes: The red curve is the non-parametric kernel regression of the welfare effects and the initial
level of per capita household expenditure. The contour lines are level curves of the non-parametric
kernel bivariate density of these two variables. Liberalization is classified as having a pro-poor bias
if the average proportional real income gains accruing to households in the the bottom 20% of the
pre-liberalization income distribution exceed the average proportional real income gains accruing to
households in the top 20% of the pre-liberalization real income income distribution.
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Figure 2
Patterns of Distributional Impacts
Pro-Rich Bias
(a) Uzbekistan
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Notes: The red curve is the non-parametric kernel regression of the welfare effects and the initial
level of per capita household expenditure. The contour lines are level curves of the non-parametric
kernel bivariate density of these two variables. Liberalization is classified as having a pro-rich bias
if the average proportional real income gains accruing to households in the the top 20% of the
pre-liberalization income distribution exceed the average proportional real income gains accruing to
households in the bottom 20% of the pre-liberalization real income income distribution.
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Figure 3
No Trade-off
Income Gains and Equality Gains
(a) Central African Republic
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Notes: The solid red line depicts how the inequality adjusted welfare gains associated with liberalization G(ε) vary with inequality
aversion ε. The dotted blue lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrap replications.
32
Figure 4
No Trade-off
Income Losses and Inequality Costs
(a) Ghana
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Notes: The solid red line depicts how the inequality adjusted welfare gains associated with liberalization G(ε) vary with inequality
aversion ε. The dotted blue lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 5
Trade-off Without Policy Preference Reversal
Income Gains and Inequality Costs
(a) Uzbekistan
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Notes: The solid red line depicts how the inequality adjusted welfare gains associated with liberalization G(ε) vary with inequality
aversion ε. The dotted blue lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 6
Trade-off with Trade Policy Preference Reversal
Income Gains and Inequality Costs
(a) Benin
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Notes: The solid red line depicts how the inequality adjusted welfare gains associated with liberalization G(ε) vary with inequality
aversion ε. The dotted blue lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 7
Trade-off with Trade Policy Preference Reversal
Income Losses and Equality Gains
(a) Mali
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Notes: The solid red line depicts how the inequality adjusted welfare gains associated with liberalization G(ε) vary with inequality
aversion ε. The dotted blue lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure 8
Trade-Off Resolution
(a) ε = 1.5
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Notes: scatter plot of the inequality-adjusted gains from trade G(ε), at ε = 1.5, against the gains from
trade G(0). The symbols represent the trade-off resolution: :: no trade-off, liberalize; u: soft trade-off,
liberalize; n: policy reversal, liberalize; 6: no trade-off, protect; s: policy reversal, protect; l: soft
trade-off, protect.
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Figure 9
Trade-Off Resolution
(a) ε = 1
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(b) ε = 2
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Notes: scatter plot of the inequality-adjusted gains from trade G(ε) against the gains from trade
G(0), for ε = 1 (panel a) and ε = 2 (panel b). The symbols represent the trade-off resolution: ::
no trade-off, liberalize; u: soft trade-off, liberalize; n: policy reversal, liberalize; 6: no trade-off,
protect; s: policy reversal, protect; l: soft trade-off, protect.
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Table 4
Gains from Trade - Winners
Gains Expenditure Income
agric. manuf. total agric. wage enter. rev. total
Cameroon 6.8 8.9 3.6 12.5 -1.7 -1.3 -0.7 -1.9 -5.6
Zambia 5.8 7.8 1.2 9.0 -1.1 -0.5 -0.7 -0.8 -3.1
Sierra Leone 4.2 5.8 1.7 7.4 -1.6 -0.1 -0.1 -1.5 -3.2
Central Africa Republic 4.2 7.1 3.7 10.8 -4.5 -0.0 0.0 -2.1 -6.6
Tanzania 4.2 4.7 4.1 8.8 -1.7 -1.1 -0.2 -1.7 -4.6
Jordan 4.0 6.2 2.1 8.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.1 -3.4 -4.3
Nigeria 3.9 6.1 2.2 8.3 -1.0 -1.9 -0.2 -1.3 -4.4
Mozambique 3.6 6.0 1.2 7.2 -1.1 -0.3 -0.1 -2.0 -3.6
Cote d’Ivoire 3.4 4.6 2.6 7.2 -1.7 -0.6 -0.4 -1.1 -3.8
Uzbekistan 3.3 5.0 1.9 7.0 -0.9 -1.1 -0.4 -1.2 -3.7
Ukraine 3.2 3.7 0.9 4.6 -0.2 -0.2 -0.0 -0.9 -1.4
Ecuador 3.0 5.9 1.5 7.3 -1.6 -1.4 -0.3 -1.0 -4.4
Kenya 2.9 6.1 2.5 8.6 -2.8 -1.2 -0.1 -1.6 -5.7
Ethiopia 2.7 4.7 1.9 6.6 -1.4 -1.1 -0.4 -1.0 -3.8
Bolivia 2.7 4.2 2.3 6.5 -1.2 -0.6 -0.6 -1.3 -3.8
Guinea 2.7 4.9 2.9 7.8 -2.0 -0.1 -0.2 -2.9 -5.1
Yemen 2.6 4.1 1.3 5.4 -0.8 -0.4 -0.1 -1.5 -2.8
Armenia 2.5 3.8 0.4 4.1 -0.5 -0.3 -0.0 -0.9 -1.7
Azerbaijan 2.4 3.9 2.3 6.2 -2.4 -0.1 0.0 -1.3 -3.8
Malawi 2.4 4.1 2.8 6.9 -2.4 -0.6 -0.3 -1.2 -4.5
South Africa 2.4 1.2 2.9 4.2 -0.1 -1.0 0.0 -0.7 -1.8
Pakistan 2.4 2.0 3.7 5.7 -1.4 -0.8 -0.3 -0.8 -3.3
Papua New Guinea 2.2 4.3 0.4 4.7 -2.3 -0.2 -0.0 0.0 -2.5
Benin 2.2 4.8 2.9 7.7 -2.0 -0.2 0.0 -3.2 -5.5
Egypt 2.2 3.7 3.6 7.3 -2.9 -0.0 -0.7 -1.4 -5.1
Togo 2.1 5.3 1.8 7.1 -0.9 -1.0 -0.9 -2.3 -5.0
Guinea Bissau 2.0 4.7 0.8 5.5 -0.9 -0.3 -0.0 -2.3 -3.6
Tajikistan 1.9 3.3 1.4 4.7 -0.2 -0.6 -0.0 -2.0 -2.8
Gambia 1.9 6.5 1.5 8.0 -0.7 -1.1 -0.6 -3.7 -6.0
Nicaragua 1.9 5.0 1.1 6.1 -1.7 -0.9 -0.3 -1.3 -4.2
Niger 1.9 4.3 2.0 6.3 -2.5 -0.0 -0.0 -1.9 -4.4
Guatemala 1.9 3.6 1.2 4.8 -0.8 -1.0 -0.2 -0.9 -2.9
Indonesia 1.9 2.8 0.5 3.2 -0.2 -0.6 -0.0 -0.6 -1.4
Uganda 1.8 5.4 1.1 6.6 -2.2 -1.0 -0.3 -1.4 -4.7
Iraq 1.6 1.5 2.0 3.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1 -1.2 -1.9
Liberia 1.5 3.3 1.3 4.6 -0.8 -0.4 -0.5 -1.3 -3.1
Nepal 1.4 2.7 1.6 4.4 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 -2.0 -3.0
Vietnam 1.1 5.1 2.0 7.1 -2.8 -1.0 -0.4 -1.8 -6.0
Georgia 1.0 2.1 0.1 2.2 -0.6 -0.0 -0.0 -0.6 -1.2
Moldova 0.7 1.4 1.5 2.9 -0.6 -0.1 -0.0 -1.4 -2.1
Burkina Faso 0.7 3.8 2.3 6.1 -2.5 -0.6 -0.5 -1.9 -5.4
Kyrgyz Republic 0.6 1.8 1.4 3.2 -0.7 -0.2 -0.0 -1.6 -2.6
Bangladesh 0.4 4.9 2.3 7.2 -3.9 -1.5 -0.1 -1.3 -6.8
Burundi 0.4 6.9 2.2 9.0 -6.2 -0.5 -0.0 -1.8 -8.6
Average 2.5 4.5 1.9 6.4 -1.6 -0.6 -0.2 -1.5 -3.9
Notes: Authors’ calculations. The gain from trade, expressed in percentage points, is the population weighted average of the proportional
change in household real expenditure.
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Table 5
Gains from Trade - Losers
Gains Expenditure Income
agric. manuf. total agric. wage enter. rev. total
Cambodia -3.1 4.4 0.9 5.4 -4.5 -0.8 0.0 -3.1 -8.4
Ghana -2.0 1.0 2.9 3.9 -1.2 -2.8 0.0 -1.8 -5.9
Mauritania -1.3 4.5 1.8 6.3 -1.1 -0.1 -0.0 -6.5 -7.6
Madagascar -1.1 3.2 0.8 3.9 -2.3 -0.9 -0.1 -1.7 -5.0
Bhutan -0.9 8.5 5.3 13.8 -3.2 -2.8 0.0 -8.7 -14.7
Mali -0.4 2.4 0.2 2.6 -1.0 0.0 -0.0 -2.0 -3.0
Sri Lanka -0.3 3.3 0.8 4.1 -1.4 -1.2 -0.7 -1.0 -4.4
Comoros -0.3 1.6 1.3 3.0 -0.7 -0.3 -0.3 -2.0 -3.2
Rwanda -0.2 3.7 1.4 5.1 -2.6 -1.1 -0.0 -1.6 -5.3
Mongolia -0.0 2.7 0.6 3.4 -0.7 -0.2 -0.1 -2.4 -3.4
Average -0.9 3.5 1.6 5.1 -1.9 -1.0 -0.1 -3.1 -6.1
Notes: Authors’ calculations. The gain from trade, expressed in percentage points, is the population weighted average
of the proportional change in household real expenditure.
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Table 6
Income Gains and Inequality Costs
without Trade Policy Preference Reversals
Income Gains Equality Gains
µ1−µ0
µ0
µ1
µ0
I0(ε)−I1(ε)
1−I0(ε)
ε = 0.5 ε = 2 ε = 7
A) Countries without Trade-offs
Guinea Bissau 2.0 0.5 0.9 1.5
Central African Republic 4.2 0.4 1.4 2.1
Jordan 4.0 0.4 1.2 1.0
Yemen 2.6 0.2 0.3 0.3
Comoros -0.3 -0.1 -0.6 -1.5
Rwanda -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -3.0
Madagascar -1.1 -0.3 -1.2 -2.3
Ghana -2.0 -0.4 -1.5 -1.9
B) Countries with Trade-offs
Pakistan 2.4 0.0 0.7 0.5
Indonesia 1.9 0.1 0.2 -0.3
Azerbaijan 2.4 0.0 0.0 -0.3
Moldova 0.7 -0.0 -0.0 0.4
Zambia 5.8 -0.0 -0.1 0.2
Ukraine 3.2 -0.0 -0.2 -0.6
Kyrgyz Republic 0.6 -0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Ukraine 3.2 -0.0 -0.2 -0.6
Egypt 2.7 -0.1 -0.4 -0.9
Tajikistan 1.9 -0.1 -0.3 -0.7
Iraq 1.6 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3
Armenia 2.5 -0.1 -0.4 -0.9
South Africa 2.4 -0.1 -0.7 -1.0
Guinea 2.7 -0.3 -0.9 -0.9
Uganda 1.8 -0.3 -0.6 0.3
Uzbekistan 3.3 -0.3 -1.1 -2.1
Cameroon 6.8 -0.5 -2.1 -4.3
Bhutan -0.9 -0.1 -1.8 -6.1
Cambodia -3.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.7
Notes: Authors’ calculations. The table presents the decomposition of the
inequality-adjusted gains from trade G(ε). The first column reports the average
income gains from trade (the proportional change in real household expenditures).
The three remaining columns show the equality gains (due to changes in inequality)
for different values of inequality aversion (low, ε = 0.5, moderate, ε = 2, and high,
ε = 7). The inequality-adjusted gains from trade is the sum of the income gains and
the equality gains. 44
Table 7
Income Gains and Inequality Costs with Trade Policy Preference Reversals
Trade Policy Preference Reversals Potential Reversals
ε∗ Lower Bound Upper bound Lower Bound Upper Bound
A) Countries with Income Gains
Bangladesh 0.37 0.51 0.64
Burkina Faso 0.46 0.56 0.65
Gambia, The 1.06 1.17 1.28
Togo 1.17 1.23 1.30
Benin 1.38 1.47 1.56
Nigeria 1.81 1.87 1.95
Vietnam 1.72 1.91 2.09
Kenya 2.34 2.49 2.71
Ethiopia 2.72 3.06 3.58
Mozambique 2.88 3.51 8.49
Guatemala 6.98 5.24 –
Liberia 3.50 4.42 –
Papua New Guinea 3.35 4.79 –
Malawi 4.05 7.06 –
Sierra Leone 4.01 –
Niger 6.01 –
Nicaragua 6.33 –
Cote d’Ivoire 7.02 –
Georgia 7.09 –
Nepal 8.79 –
Tanzania 8.85 –
Ecuador 9.92 –
B) Countries with Income Losses
Mongolia 0.05 0 0.24
Mali 0.43 0.31 0.54
Mauritania 1.63 1.49 1.80
C) Countries with multiple (potential) reversals
Countries with Income Gains
Burundi 0.10 0 0.21 5.60 7.11
Bolivia 5.81 3.94 –
8.78 3.94 –
Countries with Income Losses
Sri Lanka 0.30 0.21 0.38
8.88 7.13 –
Notes: Authors’ calculations. The table presents estimates of the trade-ε∗, the cut-off value of inequality aversion at
which there is a reversal of trade policy preference in terms of social welfare. The standard errors are estimated using
bootstrap from the household survey.
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Table 8
Decomposing Equality Gains
Consumption Equality Gains Income Equality Gains
ε = 0.5 ε = 2 ε = 7 ε = 0.5 ε = 2 ε = 7
Kenya 1.0 2.1 0.3 -1.2 -4.3 -9.0
Burundi 0.9 3.2 1.8 -2.6 -6.1 -8.4
Guinea Bissau 0.9 1.9 3.0 -0.4 -1.1 -1.0
Bhutan 0.9 2.1 2.2 -1.0 -4.1 -9.7
Sri Lanka 0.8 2.3 3.0 -0.3 -1.1 -2.4
Mali 0.6 3.1 6.7 -0.2 -1.0 -3.4
Ecuador 0.6 1.7 1.9 -0.4 -1.7 -3.6
Mauritania 0.5 1.7 3.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.5
Jordan 0.4 1.3 1.4 -0.0 -0.1 -0.3
Cambodia 0.4 0.8 0.7 -0.3 -1.1 -1.4
Yemen 0.3 0.9 1.4 -0.2 -0.5 -1.0
Central African Republic 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.1 0.6 1.0
Rwanda 0.3 1.4 1.9 -0.4 -1.6 -5.1
Nicaragua 0.3 0.7 0.5 -0.2 -0.9 -2.2
Bolivia 0.2 0.4 -0.1 -0.3 -1.3 -2.7
Vietnam 0.2 0.5 -0.3 -0.5 -1.7 -2.7
Ghana 0.2 0.8 0.9 -0.6 -2.3 -2.9
Indonesia 0.2 0.6 0.4 -0.1 -0.4 -0.7
Papua New Guinea 0.2 0.5 0.6 -0.1 -0.6 -5.7
Pakistan 0.2 1.1 1.8 -0.2 -0.4 -1.3
Egypt 0.2 0.6 0.9 -0.3 -1.0 -1.8
Nepal 0.2 0.6 1.0 -0.1 -0.6 -1.7
Cameroon 0.2 0.3 0.3 -0.7 -2.5 -5.2
Azerbaijan 0.2 0.5 0.7 -0.1 -0.5 -1.0
Cote d’Ivoire 0.1 0.1 0.5 -0.3 -1.4 -3.0
Guatemala 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.3 -1.0 -2.0
Mongolia 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.0 0.0 -0.2
Zambia 0.1 0.4 0.7 -0.1 -0.5 -0.6
Notes: The table presents the decomposition of the equality gains from tradeG(ε)−G(0). The first three column report the average consumption
equality gains from trade for different values of inequality aversion (low, ε = 0.5, moderate, ε = 2, and high, ε = 7). These consumption
equality gains are calculated by assuming that liberalization only impacts consumption and not income. The three remaining columns report
the income equality gains from trade for different values of inequality aversion (low, ε = 0.5, moderate, ε = 2, and high, ε = 7), calculated by
assuming that liberalization only impacts income but not consumption.
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Table 8
Decomposing Equality Gains (Continued)
Consumption Equality Gains Income Equality Gains
ε = 0.5 ε = 2 ε = 7 ε = 0.5 ε = 2 ε = 7
Togo 0.1 -0.0 -0.7 -0.8 -3.5 -5.3
Tanzania 0.1 0.2 0.4 -0.6 -1.6 -3.4
Comoros 0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.8 -1.3
Georgia 0.0 -0.0 -0.3 -0.0 -0.2 -0.3
Bangladesh 0.0 -0.1 -0.7 -0.4 -1.4 -2.6
Niger -0.0 -0.2 1.0 -0.3 -0.9 -2.0
Moldova -0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.0 -0.0 0.1
South Africa -0.0 -0.7 -1.4 -0.1 -0.0 0.4
Tajikistan -0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5
Ukraine -0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.0 -0.1 -0.3
Iraq -0.0 0.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.6
Kyrgyz Republic -0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.0 0.0
Gambia, The -0.0 -0.6 -0.1 -0.6 -3.0 -6.4
Armenia -0.0 -0.2 -0.9 -0.0 -0.1 0.0
Guinea -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.6 -0.7
Uganda -0.1 0.1 1.9 -0.2 -0.7 -1.9
Nigeria -0.1 -2.1 -4.4 -0.2 -2.4 -5.3
Liberia -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -0.4 -1.5
Madagascar -0.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 -1.0 -2.7
Sierra Leone -0.1 -0.2 -3.2 -0.6 -2.0 -1.4
Burkina Faso -0.2 -0.8 -1.1 -0.4 -1.1 -2.5
Ethiopia -0.3 -0.9 -1.7 -0.4 -1.0 -1.8
Benin -0.4 -1.4 -3.1 -0.4 -1.5 -3.1
Malawi -0.4 -1.1 -1.3 -0.2 -0.6 -1.2
Uzbekistan -0.4 -1.3 -2.4 0.1 0.2 0.2
Mozambique -0.5 -2.2 -3.5 -0.2 -0.5 -1.6
Average 0.1 0.2 0.3 -0.2 -0.9 -1.7
Notes: The table presents the decomposition of the equality gains from tradeG(ε)−G(0). The first three column report the average consumption
equality gains from trade for different values of inequality aversion (low, ε = 0.5, moderate, ε = 2, and high, ε = 7). These consumption
equality gains are calculated by assuming that liberalization only impacts consumption and not income. The three remaining columns report
the income equality gains from trade for different values of inequality aversion (low, ε = 0.5, moderate, ε = 2, and high, ε = 7), calculated by
assuming that liberalization only impacts income but not consumption.
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Appendix A: Household Surveys and Data
Harmonization
Table A1 displays basic information on the household surveys used in the analysis. We report
the name of the survey, the year when the data were collected and sample sizes (number of
households). The harmonization of the household surveys and the trade and trade policy
data was done in two steps. First, all household surveys product and income sources were
standardized to common templates, which are shown in Figures A1-A3 below. Second,
these harmonized household survey data were merged with HS6 tariff and trade data using
custom-made concordances.
Table A1
Household Surveys
Country Year Obs Survey
Benin 2003 5296 Questionnaire Unifie´ sur les Indicateurs de Base du Bien-Eˆtre
Burkina Faso 2003 8413 Enqueˆte sur les Conditions de Vie des Me´nages
Burundi 1998 6585 Enqueˆte Prioritaire, Etude Nationale sur les Conditions de Vie des Populations
Cameroon 2001-2002 10881 Deuxie`me Enqueˆte Camerounaise Aupre`s des Me´nages
Central African Republic 2008 6828 Enqueˆte Centrafricaine pour le Suivi-Evaluation du Bien-eˆtre
Comoros 2004 2929 Enqueˆte Inte´grale aupre`s des Me´nages
Coˆte d’Ivoire 2008 12471 Enqueˆte sur le Niveau de Vie des Me´nages
Egypt 2008-2009 23193 Household Income, Expenditure and Consumption Survey
Ethiopia 1999-2000 16505 Household Income, Consumption and Expenditure Survey
The Gambia 1998 1952 Household Poverty Survey
Ghana 2005-2006 8599 Living Standards Survey V
Guinea 2012 7423 Enqueˆte Le´ge`re pour l’Evaluation de la Pauvrete´
Guinea Bissau 2010 3141 Inquerito Ligeiro para a Avalica˜o da Pobreza
Kenya 2005 13026 Integrated Household Budget Survey
Liberia 2014-2015 4063 Household Income and Expenditure Survey
Madagascar 2005 11661 Permanent Survey of Households
Malawi 2004-2005 11167 Second Integrated Household Survey
Mali 2006 4449 Enqueˆte Le´ge`re Inte´gre´e aupre`s des Me´nages
Mauritania 2004 9272 Enqueˆte Permanente sur les Conditions de Vie des Me´nages
Mozambique 2008-2009 10696 Inque´rito sobre Oramento Familiar
Niger 2005 6621 Enqueˆte Nationale sur les Conditions de Vie des Me´nages
Nigeria 2003-2004 18603 Living Standards Survey
Rwanda 1998 6355 Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey
Sierra Leone 2011 6692 Integrated Household Survey
South Africa 2000 25491 General Household Survey
Tanzania 2008 3232 Household Budget Survey
Togo 2011 5464 Questionnaire des Indicateurs de Base du Bien-eˆtre
Uganda 2005-2006 7350 National Household Survey
Zambia 2004 7563 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey IV
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Table A1 (Continued)
Household Surveys (Continued)
Country Year Obs Survey
Armenia 2014 5124 Integrated Living Conditions Survey
Bangladesh 2010 12117 Household Income and Expenditure Survey
Bhutan 2012 8879 Living Standards Survey
Cambodia 2013 3801 Socio-Economic Survey
Indonesia 2007 12876 Indonesian Family Life Survey
Iraq 2012 24895 Household Socio-Economic Survey
Jordan 2010 11110 Household Expenditure and Income Survey
Krygyz Republic 2012 4962 Intergrated Sample Household Budget and Labor Survey
Mongolia 2011 11089 Household Socio-Economic Survey
Nepal 2010-2011 5929 Living Standards Survey
Pakistan 2010-2011 16178 Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey
Papua New Guinea 2009 3776 Household Income and Expenditure Survey
Sri Lanka 2012-2013 20335 Household Income and Expenditure Survey
Tajikistan 2009 1488 Tajikistan Panel Survey
Uzbekistan 2003 9419 Household Budget Survey
Vietnam 2012 9306 Household Living Standard Survey
Yemen 2005-2006 12998 Household Budget Survey
Azerbaijan 2005 4797 Household Budget Survey
Georgia 2014 10959 Household Integrated Survey
Moldova 2014 4836 Household Budget Survey
Ukraine 2012 10394 Sampling Survey of the Conditions of Life of Ukraine’s Households
Bolivia 2008 3900 Encuesta de Hogares
Ecuador 2013-2014 11420 Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida
Guatemala 2014 28680 Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida
Nicaragua 2009 6450 Nicaragua - Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medicio´n de Niveles de Vida
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Figure A1
Expenditure Template
 
 
 
Expenditure 
1. Agriculture/Food 
11. Staple Food 
111. Cerals 112. Legumens 113. Fruits 114. Vegetables 115. Oils/Fats 116. Fish 117. Meat/Livestock 118. Dairy/Eggs 119. Other staple food 
1111. Corn 
1112. Wheat 
1113. Rice 
1114. Other Cereals 
1121. Beans 
1122. Other 
1131. Banana 
1132. Grapes 
1133. Citrus 
1134. Apples 
1135. Other Fruits 
1141. Tomato 
1142. Potato 
1143. Greens 
1144. Other 
Vegetables 
1151. Vegetable Oils 
1152. Animal Fats 
1153. Other oils/fats 
1161. Fish 
1162. Shrimp 
1163. Other Crustacean 
1171. Pork (Pig) 
1172. Beef (Cattle) 
1173. Poultry (Chicken) 
1174. Other meat/animals 
1181. Milk 
1182. Eggs 
1183. Cheese 
1184. Other Dairy 
1191. Other staple food 
1192. Other processed food 
12. Non Staple 
121. Alcohol 122. Tobacco 123. Oil seeds 124. Spices/herbs 125. Coffee/tea/cocoa 126. Nuts 127. Cotton 128. Other non-staple food 
1211. Wine 
1212. Beer 
1213. Other alcohol 
1221. Cigarettes 
1222. Other tobacco 
1231. Soya 
1232. Other oil seeds 
1241. Cloves 
1242. Pepper 
1243. Vanilla 
1244. Saffron 
1245. Qat (chat) 
1246. Other spices 
1251. Coffee 
1252. Tea 
1253. Cocoa 
1261. Cashew 
1262. Coconut 
1263. Other nuts 
127. Cotton 1281. Sugar (any kind) 
1282. Other non-staple 
2. Manufacturing/Household Items 
21. Energy 
22. Textiles/Apparel 
23. Electric/Electronics 
24. Household items/Furniture 
25. Other physical goods 
3. Services 
31. Transportation 
32. Health 
33. Education 
34. Communication 
35. Other Services 
4. Other Expenditures 
41. Remittances/transfers given 
42. Investment of any sort 
43. Festivities 
44. Other Disbursement 
 
Figure A2
Auto-Consumption Template
 
 
 
Autoconsumption 
1. Agriculture/Food 
11. Staple Food 
111. Cerals 112. Legumens 113. Fruits 114. Vegetables 115. Oils/Fats 116. Fish 117. Meat/Livestock 118. Dairy/Eggs 119. Other staple food 
1111. Corn 
1112. Wheat 
1113. Rice 
1114. Other Cereals 
1121. Beans 
1122. Other 
1131. Banana 
1132. Grapes 
1133. Citrus 
1134. Apples 
1135. Other Fruits 
1141. Tomato 
1142. Potato 
1143. Greens 
1144. Other 
Vegetables 
1151. Vegetable Oils 
1152. Animal Fats 
1153. Other oils/fats 
1161. Fish 
1162. Shrimp 
1163. Other Crustacean 
1171. Pork (Pig) 
1172. Beef (Cattle) 
1173. Poultry (Chicken) 
1174. Other meat/animals 
1181. Milk 
1182. Eggs 
1183. Cheese 
1184. Other Dairy 
1191. Other staple food 
1192. Other processed food 
12. Non Staple 
121. Alcohol 122. Tobacco 123. Oil seeds 124. Spices/herbs 125. Coffee/tea/cocoa 126. Nuts 127. Cotton 128. Other non-staple food 
1211. Wine 
1212. Beer 
1213. Other alcohol 
1221. Cigarettes 
1222. Other tobacco 
1231. Soya 
1232. Other oil seeds 
1241. Cloves 
1242. Pepper 
1243. Vanilla 
1244. Saffron 
1245. Qat (chat) 
1246. Other spices 
1251. Coffee 
1252. Tea 
1253. Cocoa 
1261. Cashew 
1262. Coconut 
1263. Other nuts 
127. Cotton 1281. Sugar (any kind) 
1282. Other non-staple 
2. Other goods 
21. Energy (wood, coal) 
22. Gathering (forest, mushrooms, berries, etc.) 
23. Other goods collected for free 
24. Other goods produced and consumed within the household 
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Figure A3
Income Template
 
 
Income 
1. Agriculture/Food 
11. Staple Food 
111. Cerals 112. Legumens 113. Fruits 114. Vegetables 115. Oils/Fats 116. Fish 117. Meat/Livestock 118. Dairy/Eggs 119. Other staple food 
1111. Corn 
1112. Wheat 
1113. Rice 
1114. Other Cereals 
1121. Beans 
1122. Other 
1131. Banana 
1132. Grapes 
1133. Citrus 
1134. Apples 
1135. Other Fruits 
1141. Tomato 
1142. Potato 
1143. Greens 
1144. Other 
Vegetables 
1151. Vegetable Oils 
1152. Animal Fats 
1153. Other oils/fats 
1161. Fish 
1162. Shrimp 
1163. Other Crustacean 
1171. Pork (Pig) 
1172. Beef (Cattle) 
1173. Poultry (Chicken) 
1174. Other meat/animals 
1181. Milk 
1182. Eggs 
1183. Cheese 
1184. Other Dairy 
1191. Other staple food 
1192. Other processed food 
12. Non Staple 
121. Alcohol 122. Tobacco 123. Oil seeds 124. Spices/herbs 125. Coffee/tea/cocoa 126. Nuts 127. Cotton 128. Other non-staple food 
1211. Wine 
1212. Beer 
1213. Other alcohol 
1221. Cigarettes 
1222. Other tobacco 
1231. Soya 
1232. Other oil seeds 
1241. Cloves 
1242. Pepper 
1243. Vanilla 
1244. Saffron 
1245. Qat (chat) 
1246. Other spices 
1251. Coffee 
1252. Tea 
1253. Cocoa 
1261. Cashew 
1262. Coconut 
1263. Other nuts 
127. Cotton 1281. Sugar (any kind) 
1282. Other non-staple 
2. Wages 
20. Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 
21. Mining, oil, and gas extraction 
22. Manufacturing 
23. Construction 
24. Transportation, communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services 
25. Wholesale and retail trade 
26. Finance, insurance, and real estate 
27. Entertainment Services (Restaurant, entertainment, hotels, etc.) 
28. Professional Services (Education, health, other professional occupations) 
29. Public Administration 
3. Sales of Goods/Services 
31. Mining, oil, and gas extraction 
32. Manufacturing 
33. Construction 
34. Transportation, communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services 
35. Wholesale and retail trade 
36. Finance, insurance, and real estate 
37. Entertainment Services (Restaurant, entertainment, hotels, etc.) 
38. Professional Services (Education, health, other professional occupations) 
39. Public Administration 
4. Transfers 
41. Remittances/transfers received (friend, relative) 
42. Profits of investment (rent, interests) 
43. Government transfers 
44. Non-governmental transfers 
45. Other 
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Appendix B: Distributional Effects
This Appendix includes plots of the distributional effects (kernel regressions and bivariate
kernel densities) for each of the 54 countries. We first report 17 cases with a pro-poor bias
(Figures B1 to B3), then show another 37 cases with a pro-rich bias (Figures B4 to B10).
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Figure B1
Pro-Poor Bias
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Notes: The red curve is the non-parametric kernel regression of the welfare effects and the initial level of per capita household
expenditure. The contour lines are level curves of the non-parametric kernel bivariate density of these two variables. Liberalization is
classified as having a pro-poor bias if the average proportional real income gains accruing to households in the the bottom 20% of the
pre-liberalization income distribution exceed the average proportional real income gains accruing to households in the top 20% of the
pre-liberalization real income income distribution. 53
Figure B2
Pro-Poor Bias
(a) Mali
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(d) Mongolia
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Notes: The red curve is the non-parametric kernel regression of the welfare effects and the initial level of per capita household
expenditure. The contour lines are level curves of the non-parametric kernel bivariate density of these two variables. Liberalization is
classified as having a pro-poor bias if the average proportional real income gains accruing to households in the the bottom 20% of the
pre-liberalization income distribution exceed the average proportional real income gains accruing to households in the top 20% of the
pre-liberalization real income income distribution. 54
Figure B3
Pro-Poor Bias
(a) Papua New Guinea
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Notes: The red curve is the non-parametric kernel regression of the welfare effects and the initial level of per capita household
expenditure. The contour lines are level curves of the non-parametric kernel bivariate density of these two variables. Liberalization is
classified as having a pro-poor bias if the average proportional real income gains accruing to households in the the bottom 20% of the
pre-liberalization income distribution exceed the average proportional real income gains accruing to households in the top 20% of the
pre-liberalization real income income distribution. 55
Figure B4
Pro-Rich Bias
(a) Armenia
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Notes: The red curve is the non-parametric kernel regression of the welfare effects and the initial level of per capita household
expenditure. The contour lines are level curves of the non-parametric kernel bivariate density of these two variables. Liberalization
is classified as having a pro-rich bias if the average proportional real income gains accruing to households in the the top 20% of the
pre-liberalization income distribution exceed the average proportional real income gains accruing to households in the bottom 20% of
the pre-liberalization real income income distribution. 56
Figure B5
Pro-Rich Bias
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Notes: The red curve is the non-parametric kernel regression of the welfare effects and the initial level of per capita household
expenditure. The contour lines are level curves of the non-parametric kernel bivariate density of these two variables. Liberalization
is classified as having a pro-rich bias if the average proportional real income gains accruing to households in the the top 20% of the
pre-liberalization income distribution exceed the average proportional real income gains accruing to households in the bottom 20% of
the pre-liberalization real income income distribution. 57
Figure B6
Pro-Rich Bias
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Notes: The red curve is the non-parametric kernel regression of the welfare effects and the initial level of per capita household
expenditure. The contour lines are level curves of the non-parametric kernel bivariate density of these two variables. Liberalization
is classified as having a pro-rich bias if the average proportional real income gains accruing to households in the the top 20% of the
pre-liberalization income distribution exceed the average proportional real income gains accruing to households in the bottom 20% of
the pre-liberalization real income income distribution. 58
Figure B7
Pro-Rich Bias
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Notes: The red curve is the non-parametric kernel regression of the welfare effects and the initial level of per capita household
expenditure. The contour lines are level curves of the non-parametric kernel bivariate density of these two variables. Liberalization
is classified as having a pro-rich bias if the average proportional real income gains accruing to households in the the top 20% of the
pre-liberalization income distribution exceed the average proportional real income gains accruing to households in the bottom 20% of
the pre-liberalization real income income distribution. 59
Figure B8
Pro-Rich Bias
(a) Mozambique
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Notes: The red curve is the non-parametric kernel regression of the welfare effects and the initial level of per capita household
expenditure. The contour lines are level curves of the non-parametric kernel bivariate density of these two variables. Liberalization
is classified as having a pro-rich bias if the average proportional real income gains accruing to households in the the top 20% of the
pre-liberalization income distribution exceed the average proportional real income gains accruing to households in the bottom 20% of
the pre-liberalization real income income distribution. 60
Figure B9
Pro-Rich Bias
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Notes: The red curve is the non-parametric kernel regression of the welfare effects and the initial level of per capita household
expenditure. The contour lines are level curves of the non-parametric kernel bivariate density of these two variables. Liberalization
is classified as having a pro-rich bias if the average proportional real income gains accruing to households in the the top 20% of the
pre-liberalization income distribution exceed the average proportional real income gains accruing to households in the bottom 20% of
the pre-liberalization real income income distribution. 61
Figure B10
Pro-Rich Bias
(a) Vietnam
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Notes: The red curve is the non-parametric kernel regression of the welfare effects and the initial level of per capita household
expenditure. The contour lines are level curves of the non-parametric kernel bivariate density of these two variables. Liberalization
is classified as having a pro-rich bias if the average proportional real income gains accruing to households in the the top 20% of the
pre-liberalization income distribution exceed the average proportional real income gains accruing to households in the bottom 20% of
the pre-liberalization real income income distribution.
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Appendix C: Inequality Adjusted Welfare Gains
Figure C1
No Trade-off
Income Gains and Equality Gains
No Trade Policy Preference Ranking Reversals
(a) Central African Republic
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(c) Jordan
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Notes: The solid red line depicts how the inequality adjusted welfare gains associated with liberalization G(ε) vary with inequality
aversion ε. The dotted blue lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure C2
No Trade-off
Income Losses and Inequality Costs
No Trade Policy Preference Ranking Reversals
(a) Comoros
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(d) Rwanda
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Notes: The solid red line depicts how the inequality adjusted welfare gains associated with liberalization G(ε) vary with inequality
aversion ε. The dotted blue lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure C3-A
Trade-offs
Income Gains and Inequality Costs
No Trade Policy Preference Ranking Reversals
(a) Armenia
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(c) Cameroon
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Notes: The solid red line depicts how the inequality adjusted welfare gains associated with liberalization G(ε) vary with inequality
aversion ε. The dotted blue lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure C3-B
Trade-offs
Income Gains and Inequality Costs
No Trade Policy Preference Ranking Reversals
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Notes: The solid red line depicts how the inequality adjusted welfare gains associated with liberalization G(ε) vary with inequality
aversion ε. The dotted blue lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrap replications.66
Figure C3-C
Trade-offs
Income Gains and Inequality Costs
No Trade Policy Preference Ranking Reversals
(a) Ukraine
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Notes: The solid red line depicts how the inequality adjusted welfare gains associated with liberalization G(ε) vary with inequality
aversion ε. The dotted blue lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure C4-A
Trade-offs
Income Gains and Inequality Costs
Trade Policy Preference Ranking Reversals
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Notes: The solid red line depicts how the inequality adjusted welfare gains associated with liberalization G(ε) vary with inequality
aversion ε. The dotted blue lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure C4-B
Trade-offs
Income Gains and Inequality Costs
Trade Policy Preference Ranking Reversals
(a) The Gambia
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Notes: The solid red line depicts how the inequality adjusted welfare gains associated with liberalization G(ε) vary with inequality
aversion ε. The dotted blue lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrap replications.69
Figure C4-C
Trade-offs
Income Gains and Inequality Costs
Trade Policy Preference Ranking Reversals
(a) Nigeria
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Notes: The solid red line depicts how the inequality adjusted welfare gains associated with liberalization G(ε) vary with inequality
aversion ε. The dotted blue lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure C5
Trade-offs
Income Gains and Inequality Costs
Potential Trade Policy Preference Ranking Reversals
(a) Coˆte d’Ivoire
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Notes: The solid red line depicts how the inequality adjusted welfare gains associated with liberalization G(ε) vary with inequality
aversion ε. The dotted blue lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrap replications.71
Figure C5-D
Trade-offs
Income Gains and Inequality Costs
Potential Trade Policy Preference Ranking Reversals
(a) Sierra Leone
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Notes: The solid red line depicts how the inequality adjusted welfare gains associated with liberalization G(ε) vary with inequality
aversion ε. The dotted blue lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure C6
Trade-offs
Income Losses and Equality Gains
Trade Policy Preference Ranking Reversals
(a) Mali
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Notes: The solid red line depicts how the inequality adjusted welfare gains associated with liberalization G(ε) vary with inequality
aversion ε. The dotted blue lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrap replications.
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Figure C7
Trade-offs
Income Losses and Equality Gains
No Trade Policy Preference Ranking Reversals
(a) Bhutan
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Notes: The solid red line depicts how the inequality adjusted welfare gains associated with liberalization G(ε) vary with inequality
aversion ε. The dotted blue lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrap replications.
Appendix D: Alternative Model - Allowing for Elastic
Labor Supply and Non-Trade Goods Price Responses
To assess the robustness of our results, we relax the fixed factors assumption and re-estimate
the gains from trade using an alternative model that allows non-traded sector prices (NT
prices) and wages in all sectors to respond endogenously to tariffs changes. This alternative
specification closely follows Artuc, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010) and Artuc, Lederman
and Porto (2015), henceforth ALP.13 This model can be estimated using labor market data,
and then it can generate wage price elasticities through simulations. Thus the simulation
of this empirical model allows us to improve the calculation of the impact of tariff cuts on
household real incomes by including wage and labor income responses as well as non-traded
price responses (which in turn affect consumption and household enterprise income effects).
13Dix-Carneiro (2014) develops a richer and more flexible model of labor markets with imperfect mobility.
This model, however, is very intensive in data requirements and thus is difficult to estimate for all the
countries in our sample. See ALP for a thorough discussion.
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Before introducing the technical details of the model, a short synopsis of its features
will be useful. In this dynamic model, workers can move from one sector to another at a
cost that consists of a fixed and a random component. Because of this moving cost, factor
price equalization across sectors does not hold and the model can generate wage differentials
across sectors (as observed in the data). Workers move between sectors in both directions
due to the random component of the moving cost and gross worker flows can be positive
even when net worker flows are equal to zero.
Tariff reduction in the protected sectors initially changes the prices and wages in these
sectors. Subsequently, the net flow of workers from liberalized sectors to other sectors
increase, as workers maximize their expected utility by moving in response to the initial
change in the wage distribution. Since the distribution of workers across sectors thereby
also changes, the real marginal products of workers adjust, and the equilibrium wages in
all sectors respond further to the trade shock. In this setting, the moving cost parameter,
which can be estimated using labor market data, is the key parameter. Because the moving
cost determines the net flows and the diffusion of trade shocks’ from liberalized sectors to
the other sectors, it is a crucial determinant of the self and cross price elasticity of wages in
subsequent periods.
The ALP model consists of two main theoretical components: (1) Production functions
(labor demand and goods supply), and (2) workers’ decision (labor supply and goods
demand).
Production functions
There are N sectors in the economy, producing homogeneous products in a perfectly
competitive environment. Production requires (variable) labor input and a fixed factor
such as land. We assume that production functions are simple Cobb-Douglas functions.
Calibration of the production functions requires both the total wage bill and average wages
for each sector. Since workers receive their marginal product as wages, this simple setup
readily generates sector specific labor demand functions. The wage in sector g can be written
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as a function of the number of workers, Lgt and price, p
g
t :
(18) wgt = p
g
t
∂Qg(Lgt , F
g)
∂Lgt
,
where F g is the fixed factor and Qg is the total real output in sector g adhering to a
Cobb-Douglas production technology.
Unlike most of the other trade models, we assume homogeneous products since our model
is tailored to low and middle income economies that mainly produce commodities rather than
differentiated products, (see ALP section 6 for a detailed discussion). The sectors that we
consider are: agriculture; mining; manufacturing; construction; transport, communication,
electricity, gas; wholesale and retail trade; finance, insurance, real state; services 1 (education
and health related services); services 2 (other services); public administration. We use OECD
input-output tables for the calibration when the IO data is available for the country. For
others, we use regional averages from the OECD IO tables.
Workers’ decisions
Because of computational and data constraints, in what follows we assume that households
supply precisely one unit of labor. As a result, the expected wage of a worker is the expected
wage of the household, therefore there is no distinction between the household and the worker
in this framework. Any given worker is employed in one of the N sectors, she earns wage wgt
and she consumes a bundle of N goods and services based on her Cobb-Douglas preferences.
We assume that workers are risk neutral and have rational expectations.
We begin with the consumption decision. The goods and services demand function is
based on a Cobb-Douglas utility, therefore it depends only on the price, pgt , income, and
the fixed consumption shares. The fixed consumption shares are calibrated for each country
separately using the household expenditure and consumption data. The income can be
calculated using the wage distribution across sectors, wgt , and the number of workers in each
sector, Lgt .
Regarding the labor supply decision, we assume that a worker employed in sector g can
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change her sector in every time period after paying a moving cost with fixed and random
components. The moving cost can be expressed as C + ζgt for workers moving to sector
g. The fixed component C is common for all workers, while the random component ζgt
is specific to workers and drawn from an iid extreme value distribution in every period.
In this model, the workers have rational expectations, and decide based on their expected
future wages and moving costs. The workers’ employment decisions can be separated from
their agricultural production and consumption decisions, and can be summarized with the
following choice-specific.
The Bellman equation is:
(19) U g(χt, ζt) = w
g
t + η
g + max
g′
{
βEt,ζU
g′(χt+1, ζt+1)− 1g 6=g′C − ζg′t
}
,
where ηg is the choice specific fixed utility, accounting for non-wage utility such as
compensating differentials, β is the inter-temporal discount factor. The choice-specific
present discounted utility, U g(χt, ζt), is a function of the vector of random moving cost
shocks, ζt = [ζ
1
t , ζ
2
t , ..., ζ
N
t ] and the aggregate state variable χt. Note that the aggregate
state variable χt consists of present and future expected wage information Ew
g
t+n as well
as present and future expected price information Etp
g
t+n for every g ∈ 1, 2, .., N and n ≥ 0.
Given the Bellman equation above, the total number of workers in sector g can be written
as a function of only χt.
14 We assume that workers decide their next sector of employment
based on their expectations at the end of the current period.15 Thus the number of workers,
or the labor supply, for the next period can be expressed as:
(20) Lgt+1 = µ
g(χt),
using the estimate of the fixed moving cost parameter, C, the variance of the random cost,
ζt, the choice-specific fixed utility parameter, ηg, and the discount factor β. ALP estimate
moving costs for 56 countries. If our target countries are in the ALP sample, we work with
14Please see ALP for a detailed discussion and a formal derivation of the equations.
15The timing assumption is not critical, we simply follow the timing convention of previous research.
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the corresponding estimate of labor mobility costs. For those countries that are in our sample
but not in theirs, we use regional averages instead. Other parameters are calibrated as in
ALP.
Equilibrium
The equilibrium in the goods market determines the prices, pgt , for the non-traded sectors.
The prices in the traded sectors are given exogenously. Calculation of the goods market
equilibrium is relatively straightforward as it only requires setting supply equal to the
demand, which are both Cobb-Douglas functions. Therefore only the total income, the
distribution of production factors (i.e.labor), and the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas
production and utility functions are required to calculate the goods-market equilibrium.
The labor market equilibrium can be characterized with the state variable χt where the
labor allocations implied by the workers optimization problem in (19) and (20), i.e. labor
supply, are equal to the labor allocations implied by the labor demand equations, (18), for
the given χt.
6.1 Calibration at the steady state
We assume that there are no aggregate shocks apart from the trade shocks in the economy,
i.e. χt+1 = χt. We take the labor allocations, L
g
t , and wages, w
g
t , from the data, and
impose them for future wages and labor allocations, i.e. set Lgt+1 = L
g
t , and w
g
t+1 = w
g
t .
We normalize prices to be equal to unity before the trade shock. Thus, it is possible to
construct the state variable χt with the available wage data and normalization of prices for
the steady state before the unanticipated trade shock. We take the Cobb-Douglas production
function parameters from IO tables and Cobb-Douglas expenditure share parameters from
the household data. We calibrate the remaining technology and utility function parameters
such that equations (18) and (20) are satisfied for the steady state χt implied by the data.
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Trade shock simulations
In this set up, we simulate a full unanticipated trade liberalization shock (i.e., full elimination
of tariffs on agricultural goods and manufactures), consistent with the tariff cuts utilized to
measure the price changes for all terms in the first order approximation formula:
(21)
dV hi
eh
= −
(
−shi −
∑
k∈NT
shk
∂pk
∂pi
pi
pk
+ φhw
∂lh
∂pi
pi
lh
+ φhi +
∑
k∈NT
φhk
∂pk
∂pi
pi
pk
)
τi
1 + τi
+ Ψhi .
Note that this formula is similar to equation (6) but now also accounts for non-traded goods
price responses.
The trade shock is characterized by an unexpected price change in the traded-goods
sectors at time t after the reduction of tariffs, implied by equation (5). With this price
change, wages in the traded-goods sectors decrease instantaneously since the wage in given
sector is equal to the price times the marginal product of labor. Consequently, workers
respond to the decrease in traded-goods sector wages, and the labor allocation changes,
which in turn changes wages further as the marginal product of labor changes. Meanwhile,
the demand for goods change as income changes. The supply of goods changes simultaneously
as the semi-flexible production factor, labor, reallocates.
In order to solve this model, we need to solve the current and future wages and prices
simultaneously since decisions today depend on the expected wages and prices in the future.
This procedure is equivalent to finding a fixed point for χt using equations (18) and (20).
The details of the simulation algorithm are described in ALP.16
Once we obtain the new fixed point for the state variable χt through the simulations, we
uncover the wage responses ∂wgt /∂p
i as well as of the non-traded price responses ∂pkt /∂p
i for
all sectors and future time periods, as elements of the state variable χt. Note that there is
no aggregate uncertainty after the trade shock, i.e. Etw
g
t+n = w
g
t+n. We can therefore safely
ignore the expectation operator for the aggregate variables in the simulations.
16In short, we impose the non-traded goods prices into χt and solve for the remaining equilibrium wages,
wgt+n and prices, p
g
t+n for every n ≥ 0.
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Response of wages after the trade shock
Given these simulation results, we can summarize the wage responses. In what follows, we
work with present discounted total wage income responses that take into account the entire
expected evolution of wages. For a worker who is initially in sector g, we calculate:
(22)
∂̂wg
∂pi
=
∑
t
βt
∂wgt
∂pi
,
where β is the discount factor.
The intertemporal nature of equation (22) is a consequence of the dynamic set up of
Artuc, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010) that we use to estimate these effects. Because our
household welfare metric (equation (1)) is static, three important clarifications must be made.
First of all, to derive the welfare effects (21), we compute the first order effects of a price
change. In this approximation, household adjustments (such as consumption or production
responses) are second order effects, but the responses of wages and non-traded prices are first
order effects.17 Second, equation (22) is actually a first order approximation to the change
in the lifetime welfare of a worker that stays in sector g so that this approximation is in fact
consistent with our focus on first order effects.18 Finally, to fit this lifetime change into our
framework, we need to calculate ∂lh/∂pi (in (6)) such that its present discounted value is
(22). Thus, our estimates of the labor income effect are
(23)
∂̂lh
∂pi
= (1− β)
∑
t
βt
∂̂wgt
∂pi
,
where
∂̂wgt
∂pi
are imputed using the simulated wage responses.
17To elaborate on this point, the argument is the following. To first order, the dynamic adjustment
of the household, in terms of consumption and production decisions, can be ignored. As a result, this
first order approximation does have an error, but this error (which includes dynamic adjustments) is small
(under the standard assumption that households are optimizing consumption and production decisions).
The adjustment of wages is instead a first order effect and, consequently, not including it leads to first order
errors. See Porto (2006).
18For a formal derivation and discussion of this result, see Artuc, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2010) and
ALP.
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We follow a similar approach to estimate the responses of the prices of non-traded goods:
(24)
∂̂pk
∂pi
= (1− β)
∑
t
βt
∂̂pkt
∂pi
.
6.2 Results
The estimates, reported in Table D1, show that when trade is liberalized, agricultural
wages drop most precipitously, by 7.3 percent on average across countries, reflecting the
comparatively high tariffs on agriculture in the status quo and the fact that the tariff
shock directly impacts the price of agricultural goods. Unlike our main model, wages in
other sectors also decrease, as we are now allowing for general equilibrium effects in (21).
Wage decreases tend to be larger in countries in which tariffs were higher to begin with
such as Bhutan and the Central African Republic, and smaller in countries in which tariffs
were relatively low, such as Georgia and the Ukraine. The heterogeneity in initial tariffs,
in conjunction with differences in labor allocation and moving costs, explains why wage
responses are heterogeneous across both countries and sectors.
The most salient feature of these results, reported in Table D2, is that price responses
of the non-traded goods are negative for all goods in all countries. This result is to be
expected because the reduction in tariffs reduces nominal income losses, which reduces the
demand for non-traded goods and consequently puts downward pressure on prices. Overall,
the magnitude of the price change is lower for non-traded goods than for traded goods,
mostly because the former are driven by endogenous responses of the economy in general
equilibrium. However, the estimated price changes of both traded and non-traded goods can
be sizeable, as they are in Bhutan and the Central African Republic, where prices decline by
more than 10 across sectors. Other countries with substantial price declines across sectors
are Burkina Faso, Rwanda and Togo. These results depend not only on the size of the initial
tariff cut but also on the relative importance of the tradable sectors in the economy.
The response of non-tradeables prices also results in reduced revenue for households
running non-farm enterprises producing such non-tradeables, yet is a boon for consumers.
As a result of these effects and the different wage responses, estimated gains from trade also
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change relative to the baseline model presented in the main text. Tables D3 and D4 present
estimates of the gains from trade, and how they arise, for winners and losers respectively.
We continue to find gains in 44 countries and losses in 10 countries. Non-traded good prices
responses yield consumption gains that are on average 0.7 percent across countries. However,
they also result in sharper reductions in wages and enterprise income. On average, estimated
aggregate gains from trade are 0.3 percent lower across countries then in our baseline model.
The pattern of inequality adjusted gains from trade, presented in Table D5, remains very
similar to our baseline model. There is marked heterogeneity across countries, yet gains from
trade are positive on average, and tend to fall as inequality aversion rises. Again, average
income gains are inversely correlated with equality gains.
For purposes of comparison, Figure D1 demonstrates how the resulting trade-offs are
resolved using this alternative model using ε = 1.5. As in our main model, these trade-offs are
typically resolved in favor of liberalization. Overall, the patterns of results and conclusions
presented in the main text are qualitatively robust to using this alternative model.
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Figure D1
Trade-Off Resolution
Alternative Model
(a) ε = 1.5
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Notes: scatter plot of the inequality-adjusted gains from trade G(ε) against the gains from trade
G(0), for ε = 1 (panel a) and ε = 2 (panel b). The symbols represent the trade-off resolution:
:: no trade-off, liberalize; u: soft trade-off, liberalize; n: policy reversal, liberalize; 6: no
trade-off, protect; s: policy reversal, protect; l: soft trade-off, protect. The gains from trade
are calculated using a model that allows for labor market frictions and non-traded goods price
responses, discussed in detail in Appendix D.
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Table D1
Alternative Model
Wage Responses
Ag Mining Manuf Constr Tansp Retail Banks Serv 1 Serv 2 Adm
Benin -7.6 -4.6 -6.5 -5.1 -4.9 -5.6 0.0 -4.1 -5.6 -6.0
Burkina Faso -12.0 -9.1 -9.6 -10.1 -10.2 -9.1 -9.2 -8.6 -9.8 0.0
Burundi -12.4 0.0 -6.5 -4.3 -5.3 -6.7 -1.2 -6.4 0.0 -7.0
Cameroon -11.1 -8.4 -12.4 -8.8 -9.3 -7.6 -10.3 -6.1 0.0 0.0
Central African Rep. -13.8 0.0 -14.6 -13.4 -13.2 -13.0 0.0 -11.7 -13.2 -13.4
Comoros -3.0 -2.4 -5.0 -3.1 -3.4 -3.6 -2.5 -2.4 -3.5 0.0
Coˆte d’Ivoire -6.1 -4.0 -5.7 0.0 -3.7 -4.6 -3.2 -3.1 0.0 -4.1
Egypt -2.8 -2.1 -6.2 -2.3 -3.3 -2.5 -3.8 -2.4 -2.7 -3.1
Ethiopia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
The Gambia -6.3 -3.5 -7.4 -4.9 -5.2 -5.2 -5.2 -4.2 -5.6 -5.7
Ghana -11.6 -7.9 -10.5 -9.0 -8.9 -8.8 -8.1 -7.3 -8.8 -8.8
Guinea -11.1 -6.8 -8.5 -7.8 -7.8 -7.6 0.0 -6.2 -7.7 -7.7
Guinea Bissau -11.7 -8.3 -9.7 -9.1 -9.2 -9.1 0.0 -7.8 -9.2 -9.2
Kenya -13.2 -6.9 -8.9 -8.6 -8.6 -8.6 -7.7 -5.6 -8.6 -8.6
Liberia -3.7 -3.0 -6.5 -4.5 -3.1 -2.1 -5.3 -2.0 -2.2 -4.6
Madagascar -6.1 -4.1 -7.9 -5.4 -5.8 -5.5 -5.9 -3.0 -5.4 -6.0
Malawi -11.0 0.0 -8.5 -8.6 -7.8 -8.4 -7.1 -6.2 -7.9 -7.7
Mali -10.7 -7.3 -9.3 -9.6 -9.3 -9.7 0.0 -7.1 -9.3 -9.3
Mauritania -7.7 -4.0 -8.1 -3.9 -5.3 -4.0 0.0 -1.5 0.0 -5.5
Mozambique -6.0 -4.0 -5.2 -4.3 -4.4 -4.2 -4.1 -2.0 -4.3 -4.4
Niger -8.3 -5.9 -6.8 -6.3 -5.8 -6.3 0.0 -4.3 -6.6 -6.8
Nigeria -10.9 -6.9 -9.4 -9.1 -9.7 -9.3 -7.6 -8.2 0.0 0.0
Rwanda -15.1 -7.2 -9.7 -9.9 -9.9 -9.9 -8.3 -5.5 0.0 -10.0
Sierra Leone -4.2 -2.6 -3.7 -2.1 -1.8 -1.2 -3.6 -1.6 -2.0 -1.8
South Africa -5.3 -5.1 -8.1 -5.1 -5.7 -5.2 -6.0 -4.7 -6.0 -6.0
Tanzania -11.4 -6.7 -9.0 0.0 -7.6 -8.1 -6.9 -6.1 0.0 -7.7
Togo -10.6 -8.1 -10.3 -10.0 -9.7 -9.5 -8.1 -7.0 -10.2 -8.9
Uganda -12.9 -7.1 -8.7 -8.2 -8.1 -8.2 -7.2 -5.8 -7.9 -8.0
Zambia -8.0 -3.0 -4.0 0.0 -2.4 -1.8 -3.7 -2.0 0.0 -2.9
Notes: Authors’ calculations. The numbers in the table are the proportional average wage responses expressed in percentage
points to a full tariff elimination shock (in agriculture and manufacturing). The wage responses are estimated with simulation
methods using the model and data from Artuc, Lederman, and Porto (2015).
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Table D1
Alternative Model
Wage Responses (Continued)
Ag Mining Manuf Constr Tansp Retail Banks Serv 1 Serv 2 Adm
Armenia -2.6 -1.0 -3.4 -1.7 -1.7 -1.6 -1.2 -1.2 -1.4 -1.7
Bangladesh -6.5 -3.8 -11.8 -5.3 -4.8 -5.2 -4.6 -2.6 -5.8 0.0
Bhutan -23.9 -12.5 -16.1 -15.0 -15.0 -15.0 -13.2 -12.4 -14.9 -15.0
Cambodia -3.8 -3.5 -5.4 -3.8 -3.8 -3.8 -3.9 -3.4 -3.8 -3.8
Indonesia -1.8 -2.2 -3.2 -2.1 -2.4 -2.1 -2.8 -2.0 0.0 0.0
Iraq -1.8 -1.6 -2.3 0.4 -1.2 -0.4 -1.3 -0.5 -1.5 -1.7
Jordan -5.6 -2.7 -6.1 -3.1 -3.1 -2.9 -2.3 -1.3 -3.1 -2.9
Kyrgyz Republic -3.1 -2.0 -3.0 -2.6 -2.6 -2.6 -2.1 -1.7 -2.6 -2.6
Mongolia -1.8 -1.4 -1.7 -1.1 -1.2 -1.0 -1.0 -0.8 -1.0 -1.0
Nepal -8.0 -5.3 -8.4 -6.3 -6.4 -6.4 -5.8 -5.2 -6.4 -6.5
Pakistan -5.4 -4.1 -8.1 -5.4 -5.0 -4.5 -5.3 -3.2 -5.4 0.0
Papua New Guinea -3.0 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.0 -0.8 -1.2 -1.3
Sri Lanka -8.0 -5.3 -9.6 -7.2 -7.2 -7.3 -5.8 -5.4 -7.2 -7.1
Tajikistan -5.3 -3.6 -5.1 -4.4 -4.4 -4.4 -3.8 -2.9 -4.3 -4.4
Uzbekistan -6.0 -4.2 -6.6 -4.9 -4.7 -5.0 -4.5 -4.0 -4.5 -4.8
Vietnam -6.0 -4.5 -6.1 -4.4 -4.8 -4.6 -4.7 -3.5 -4.7 -4.6
Yemen -3.8 -3.2 -4.6 -3.6 -3.6 -3.8 -3.4 -2.9 -3.6 -3.6
Azerbaijan -4.4 0.0 -6.8 -4.7 0.0 -3.6 0.0 -2.1 -3.5 -3.8
Georgia -2.1 -0.5 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 -0.8 -0.6 -0.5 -0.8 -0.8
Moldova -4.5 -1.8 -3.0 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -2.3 -2.1 -2.8 -2.8
Ukraine -2.2 -0.2 -2.2 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.7 -0.3 -0.6 -0.9
Bolivia -6.8 -5.6 -7.6 -6.1 -6.2 -6.3 -6.2 -5.1 -6.3 -6.3
Ecuador -6.5 -4.5 -5.6 -5.1 -5.1 -5.1 -4.6 -4.1 -5.0 -5.1
Guatemala -8.0 -6.4 -7.9 -5.6 -6.2 -5.8 -6.5 -4.5 -6.2 -6.8
Nicaragua -6.9 -4.9 -6.2 -5.5 -5.4 -5.5 -5.0 -4.5 -5.4 -5.4
Average -7.3 -4.2 -6.8 -5.1 -5.4 -5.3 -4.0 -4.1 -4.4 -4.7
Notes: Authors’ calculations. The numbers in the table are the proportional average wage responses to a full tariff elimination
shock (in agriculture and manufacturing). The wage responses are estimated with simulation methods using the model and
data from Artuc, Lederman, and Porto (2015).
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Table D3
Alternative Model
Gains from Trade - Winners
Gains Expenditure Income
traded non-traded total agric. wage enter. rev. total
Cameroon 5.9 12.5 0.5 13.0 -1.7 -1.8 -1.7 -1.9 -7.1
Zambia 5.6 9.0 0.0 9.0 -1.1 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 -3.3
Tanzania 4.5 8.8 0.5 9.3 -1.7 -1.1 -0.3 -1.7 -4.8
Nigeria 4.4 8.3 0.6 8.9 -1.0 -1.6 -0.6 -1.3 -4.5
Central African Republic 4.4 10.8 1.2 12.0 -4.5 -0.4 -0.6 -2.1 -7.6
Sierra Leone 4.1 7.4 0.2 7.7 -1.6 -0.3 -0.2 -1.5 -3.6
Jordan 4.0 8.3 0.9 9.2 -0.4 -1.1 -0.3 -3.4 -5.2
Uzbekistan 3.6 7.0 0.3 7.3 -0.9 -1.0 -0.6 -1.2 -3.7
Coˆte d’Ivoire 3.3 7.2 0.7 7.9 -1.7 -0.5 -1.3 -1.1 -4.6
Ethiopia 3.1 6.6 0.7 7.2 -1.4 -1.1 -0.6 -1.0 -4.1
Ukraine 3.1 4.6 0.1 4.7 -0.2 -0.4 -0.0 -0.9 -1.6
Kenya 2.7 8.6 1.9 10.5 -2.8 -3.0 -0.4 -1.6 -7.8
Mozambique 2.6 7.2 0.4 7.6 -1.1 -1.2 -0.8 -2.0 -5.0
Benin 2.4 7.7 0.5 8.2 -2.0 -0.5 -0.0 -3.2 -5.8
Armenia 2.3 4.1 0.2 4.4 -0.5 -0.6 -0.1 -0.9 -2.1
Papua New Guinea 2.2 4.7 0.1 4.8 -2.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -2.6
Guatemala 2.2 7.3 1.1 8.4 -1.6 -2.7 -0.9 -1.0 -6.2
Azerbaijan 2.1 6.2 0.2 6.4 -2.4 -0.6 0.0 -1.3 -4.3
Guinea 2.1 7.8 1.0 8.8 -2.0 -0.7 -1.2 -2.9 -6.8
Niger 1.9 6.3 0.5 6.8 -2.5 -0.4 -0.1 -1.9 -4.9
Indonesia 1.9 3.2 0.2 3.4 -0.2 -0.8 -0.0 -0.6 -1.5
Yemen 1.7 5.4 0.6 6.1 -0.8 -1.4 -0.6 -1.5 -4.3
Nepal 1.7 4.4 1.9 6.3 -0.5 -1.3 -0.7 -2.0 -4.6
Tajikistan 1.6 4.7 0.7 5.4 -0.2 -1.3 -0.4 -2.0 -3.8
Nicaragua 1.6 6.1 1.2 7.2 -1.7 -1.7 -0.9 -1.3 -5.7
Uganda 1.5 6.6 1.6 8.2 -2.2 -1.5 -1.6 -1.4 -6.7
Iraq 1.5 3.5 0.1 3.6 -0.4 -0.4 -0.1 -1.2 -2.1
Bolivia 1.5 6.5 1.3 7.9 -1.2 -2.1 -1.7 -1.3 -6.4
Egypt 1.4 7.3 0.3 7.6 -2.9 -0.0 -1.9 -1.4 -6.2
Pakistan 1.4 5.7 0.4 6.1 -1.4 -1.0 -1.5 -0.8 -4.7
Ecuador 1.3 4.8 1.0 5.8 -0.8 -1.8 -0.9 -0.9 -4.5
Malawi 1.1 6.9 0.7 7.6 -2.4 -1.5 -1.3 -1.2 -6.4
The Gambia 1.0 8.0 0.5 8.5 -0.7 -2.1 -1.1 -3.7 -7.5
Georgia 1.0 2.2 0.2 2.5 -0.6 -0.2 -0.1 -0.6 -1.5
Liberia 0.9 4.6 0.4 4.9 -0.8 -0.9 -1.0 -1.3 -4.0
Bangladesh 0.9 7.2 0.7 7.9 -3.9 -1.1 -0.7 -1.3 -7.0
Vietnam 0.8 7.1 0.8 7.8 -2.8 -1.5 -0.9 -1.8 -7.0
Guinea Bissau 0.8 5.5 0.5 6.0 -0.9 -1.4 -0.6 -2.3 -5.2
Togo 0.7 7.1 2.8 9.9 -0.9 -2.0 -4.0 -2.3 -9.2
Burkina Faso 0.7 6.1 1.1 7.3 -2.5 -0.6 -1.7 -1.9 -6.5
South Africa 0.5 4.2 0.8 5.0 -0.1 -3.7 0.0 -0.7 -4.5
Moldova 0.2 2.9 0.4 3.3 -0.6 -1.0 -0.0 -1.4 -3.1
Burundi 0.1 9.0 0.5 9.5 -6.2 -0.7 -0.6 -1.8 -9.4
Kyrgyz Republic 0.0 3.2 0.4 3.6 -0.7 -0.9 -0.3 -1.6 -3.6
Average 2.1 6.4 0.7 7.1 -1.6 -1.2 -0.8 -1.5 -5.0
Notes: Authors’ calculations. The gain from trade, expressed in percentage points, is the population weighted average of the proportional
change in household real expenditure.
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Table D4
Alternative Model
Gains from Trade - Losers
Gains Expenditure Income
traded non-traded total agric. wage enter. rev. total
Cambodia -3.2 5.4 0.6 6.0 -4.5 -0.9 -0.7 -3.1 -9.2
Bhutan -1.9 13.8 2.2 16.0 -3.2 -5.7 -0.3 -8.7 -17.9
Sri Lanka -1.9 4.1 1.3 5.4 -1.4 -2.3 -2.5 -1.0 -7.3
Madagascar -1.4 3.9 0.2 4.2 -2.3 -1.0 -0.6 -1.7 -5.6
Mauritania -1.2 6.3 0.2 6.5 -1.1 -0.1 -0.0 -6.5 -7.7
Ghana -1.2 3.9 2.3 6.1 -1.2 -4.2 0.0 -1.8 -7.3
Rwanda -1.1 5.1 0.4 5.5 -2.6 -2.0 -0.4 -1.6 -6.6
Mali -0.9 2.6 0.3 3.0 -1.0 -0.5 -0.5 -2.0 -3.9
Comoros -0.4 3.0 0.7 3.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.6 -2.0 -4.0
Mongolia -0.2 3.4 0.1 3.4 -0.7 -0.4 -0.1 -2.4 -3.6
Average -1.3 5.1 0.8 6.0 -1.9 -1.8 -0.6 -3.1 -7.3
Notes: Authors’ calculations. The gain from trade, expressed in percentage points, is the population weighted average
of the proportional change in household real expenditure.
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